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Introduction to 
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Trade Credit: 
Evidence from Chinese SME Data 
Liu Yajing1 
 
 
1 Motivation 
 
There were more than 40 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
China in 20092, comprising 60% of the state GDP and 50% of total taxes to the 
state, and providing over 80% of jobs. In particular, SMEs have played a 
significant role in absorbing rural laborers and thus helping to maintain urban 
economic stability. Despite their importance, financing sources for SMEs have not 
been sufficient. According to the World Bank’s 2003 Investment Climate Survey, 
compared to other Asian countries, Chinese SMEs faced many financial 
constraints and received less financial support from banks, with only 12% of their 
working capital coming from bank loans (Dollar et.al.2003)3. Compounded by the 
effects of the global financial crisis of 2008, SMEs in China have faced many 
problems, including a decline in stock prices, credit insecurity, increasing costs, 
and decreasing exports. As a result, many SMEs in China had fallen into a 
serious financial deficit situation, with some even declaring bankruptcy. These 
bankruptcies were caused in part by a lack of financial support. This paper 
discusses how to improve SMEs’ financing difficulties by comparing different 
approaches to obtaining financial support. 
It is widely recognized that the development of SMEs has a high correlation with 
China’s overall economic growth. However, it is very difficult to observe the 
financial environment of SMEs, and it is also very challenging to measure the 
                                            
1 Present address: Ph.D. Student, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Hyogo, Japan. Email: 
Liu_yajingdekiru@yahoo.co.jp 
2 See “ The Blue Book of Small and Medium Enterprises in China: Development, Financing, Service and Policies 
(2010). 
3 Bank loans in China represent only 12% of the working capital of SMEs, while this figures is much higher in other 
parts of Asia (21% in Malaysia, 24% in Indonesia, 28% in the Philippines, and 26% in Korea and Thailand). See Dollar 
et.al. (2003), p.31.  
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financial efficiency of different financial sources, due to informational opacity and 
incomplete contracts that is typical with SMEs. This research attempts to identify 
a suitable financial channel for SMEs. Moreover, the way in which different 
financial sources affect the labor productivity of SMEs is analyzed. The financing 
of Chinese SMEs is analyzed in three stages. 
 
2 Backgrounds 
 
2.1 The definition and the ownership for SMEs of enterprise in China  
 
There are three ways to distinguish the large, medium, and small enterprises: 
Ownership structure, firm size and financing category4. This paper uses firm size 
and ownership structure and because the data that is analyzed is for industrial 
enterprises, the definitions for industry firm size set by the State Statistics Bureau 
of China (SSBC) 2011 are used. These definitions are as follows: 
Small:  300 < = sales < 2,000(10,000 CNY units) and employees < 300; 
Medium: 2,000 < = sales < 40,000 and 300 < = employees < =1,000; 
Large:   sales > 40,000 and employees > 1,000. 
The unit for sales is millions of yuan. 
Next, the classification of industry firm ownership is introduced. Ownership 
definitions were first published by SSBC in 1996, and later improved in 2006.The 
definitions are as follows5: 
 
 F1: State Owned Enterprise 
 F2: Collectively Owned Enterprise 
 F3: Private Enterprise  
 F4: Joint Economy & Share Holding Enterprise 
 F5: Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong 
                                            
4 See Lijun Fan (2013). 
5 There are 7 ownership groups in the 2006 definitions of SSBC, State-owned Enterprise, Collectively Owned 
Enterprise, Private Enterprise, Joint Economy, Share Holding Economy, Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs 
& Entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and Others. In order to facilitate the analysis in this paper, the 7 
groups are reduced to 5 by merging Joint Economy and Share Holding Economy into one group, and dropping the 
Others group because there are few data points in this group. 
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Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
 
According to Li (2010)6, in 2009, there were 42.39 million SMEs, 31.96 million 
private enterprises (representing 75% of all enterprises), 0.49 million state owned 
enterprises, 0.75 million collectively owned enterprises, and 0.43 million foreign 
entrepreneurs. It is widely believed that state owned enterprises are large 
enterprises, but in reality, SMEs can also be state owned enterprises.  
 
2.2 The main problems related to financing for SMEs in China 
 
Firstly, we focus on the financial credit guarantee system for the SMEs. China has 
credit supplementation, but there is no sound system to ensure that SMEs 
obtaining financing sources from banks. After the global financial crisis in 2008, 
the Chinese government implemented some policies to create a more favorable 
financial environment for SMEs.  
In the first half of 2009, the country increased the total number of loans to 
enterprises by with 3.9 trillion yuan, and SMEs’ share of loans rose to 56.6%7. Yet 
this alone was not sufficient to resolve the credit constraints and the limited 
access to private finance. The use of formal finance is also limited. According to 
the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) Survey of 2009, over 
95% of SMEs cannot get formal financing options offered by state owned banks8. 
Another issue is that many start-up firms and small business use their own 
sources of capital as their major fanatical source, but cannot get support from 
formal financial sources. Although there is a clear problem of information 
asymmetry, practically for start-ups and small enterprises, the main problem is 
that China lacks a system that offers appropriate collateral and support for SMEs’ 
repayments to banks. Furthermore, there is no credit rating system for SMEs in 
China. A nationwide credit assessment system for SMEs is currently being 
                                            
6 See “ The Blue Book of small and Medium Enterprises in China: Development, Financing, Service and Policies 
(2010) p.3-20. 
7 See Xu & Ding (2010), p.109-114. 
8 See “ The Blue Book of small and Medium Enterprises in China: Development, Financing, Service and Policies 
(2010) p.11-15. 
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proposed to put in place before 20209.  
 
Secondly, there are few financing channels besides bank loans. SMEs cannot 
obtain financing directly from the financial market (such as the stock markets). 
Kanamori and Zhao (2004) find that only 6-7% of household deposits used in the 
stock market, fewer use for SMEs.  
 
Finally, while this paper emphasizes external factors, that affect the financing 
environments for SMEs, a close examination of SMEs’ internal factors reveals 
that these do not contribute to a very optimistic outcome, either. Poor financial 
performance among SMEs and bad loans raise the risks and costs for banks, 
which helps to explain why banks generally prefer to work with state owned or 
larger enterprises.   
 
3 Perspectives and approaches for the this research 
 
Three different angles of SME financing in China are analyzed in this paper, in an 
attempt to find a suitable financial channel for SMEs. Moreover, the way in which 
different financial sources affect the labor productivity of SMEs is also examined. 
The analysis is divided in the following three chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 attempts to verify the effectiveness of the business model for Chinese 
SMEs experiencing financial difficulties. Compared to big enterprises, the 
implications of financing difficulties for SMEs are more serious due to 
informational opacity and incomplete contracts. The main function of relationship 
banking is to gather soft information about firms, information that is usually difficult 
to access. By gathering soft information, banks are able to mitigate the demands 
and requirements of firms. As a result, in the long term, banks can provide 
constant financial support and offer advice to assist SMEs in their development. In 
this analysis, data from Zhejiang province in China is used to verify several 
hypotheses about relationship banking. It is shown that there are distinct merits of 
                                            
9 See Huang (2009), p.14-16. 
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relationship banking, while the demerits remain unclear. Therefore, the 
relationship banking model may be one way to resolve the financing difficulties of 
Chinese SMEs. 
 
Chapter 2 analyses a different financial channel for SMEs. If a firm’s use of 
access to formal finance is limited, it may use trade credit as an alternative 
financing method with its partners. In China, there are three main modes of 
corporate finance: Bank loans, security issuance, and trade credit. Compared to 
bank loans and security issuance, trade credit between business partners is a 
more favored method for corporations, particularly SMEs. Using a large panel 
dataset of Chinese industrial firms, this study finds that SMEs, particularly small 
firms, are more likely to use trade credit as a financing source than formal 
financial channels from financial institutions. The analysis clearly distinguishes 
between the trade credit of suppliers and demanders, and the relationship of each 
group is estimated using both trade credit and financial institutions. The evidence 
suggests that small firms use more trade credit, and have a stronger substitute 
relationship with using formal financial channels from financial institutions. It is 
also found that the ownership structure does not affect their use of trade credit. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the efficiency of financial sources by measuring productivity 
using firm-level panel data. The effect of ownership and firm size on the 
productivity of Chinese industrial firms is studied. Then, the relationship between 
productivity and the financial source is examined. There are two financial sources 
for enterprises in this data, trade credit, and bank loans. Long-term liabilities are 
used to represent bank loans, and we use accounts payable, accounts receivable 
and other relevant variables to represent trade credit. It is found that enterprises, 
experienced productivity increases, as a result of using more trade credit and less 
bank loans. The ownership and the size of firms in the industry are also measured, 
but there is no particularly powerful evidence that a firm’s ownership will affect the 
enterprise's productivity through based on the financial source. 
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                    Chapter 1 
Relationship Banking and SME Finance in China: An Analysis 
Based on the Survey of Zhejiang Province in 2010 
Liu Yajing1 
 
Abstract 
This paper intends to verify the effectiveness of the relationship banking 
business model for financial distress to Chinese small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Compared to big enterprises, the causes of financial distress for SMEs 
are more serious due to informational opacity and incomplete contracts. The 
purpose of relationship banking is for banks to gather soft information, which is 
usually difficult to access, which helps to resolve these two issues. In addition, 
by gathering the soft information, banks are able to regulate the demands and 
requirements of firms. In the long term, banks can provide constant financial 
support. At the same time, they can offer advice to help SMEs develop. In this 
paper, data from Zhejiang province in China is used to verify several hypotheses 
about relationship banking. Through this analysis, it is shown that there are 
distinct merits of relationship banking, while the demerits are unclear. Therefore, 
the relationship banking model may be one way to resolve the financial 
difficulties of Chinese SMEs. 
  
1 Introduction 
 
SMEs have played a very important role in China’s impressive economic growth. 
But the global financial crisis of 2008 affected SMEs in China, as they faced 
many problems including the decline in stock prices, credit insecurity, increasing 
costs, and decreasing exports. As a result, many SMEs in China fell into a 
serious financial deficit situation, with some even declaring bankruptcy. The 
main reason for these SMEs’ bankruptcies was the lack of financial support. In 
conducting this research, the aim is to provide insight into how relationship 
                                            
1 Present address: Ph.D. Student, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Hyogo, 
Japan. Email: Liu_yajingdekiru@yahoo.co.jp 
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banking affects the financing for SMEs, and how SMEs can obtain financial 
support from banks. 
 
Berger and Udell (2002) argue that soft information is different from hard 
information, and define it as unquantifiable, unverifiable and undocumentable 
information. Yet relationship banking can address the financial difficulties faced 
by SMEs through the collection of soft information by banks. Since Petersen and 
Rajan (1994), many researchers have measured the relationship between banks 
and borrowers by observing the length of the relationship, or the number of trade 
banks. It has become the most commonly used method for measuring 
relationship banking in applied empirical research on SMEs.  
 
However, there is a lack of research about relationship banking for Chinese 
SMEs. In this paper, the reality of the relationship banking situation in China is 
presented, with a particular focus on relationship lending for SMEs. Several 
hypotheses are proposed about the merits and demerits of relationship banking, 
and data on Chinese SMEs are used to test these hypotheses. The remainder of 
this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the state of SME 
financing and the problems that they face in China. Section 3 discusses the 
existing literature on relationship banking. Section 4 describes the data and 
methodology, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The state of SME financing and the problems faced by SMES in China 
 
2.1 The definition and the ownership of SMEs in China 
 
In order to examine the effect of the firm’s size and ownership structure on the 
relationship between firms and financial sources, the definitions for industry firm 
size used by the State Statistics Bureau of China (SSBC) 2011 are outlined, as 
follows: 
Small:  300 < = sales < 2,000 (10,000 CNY units) and employees < 300; 
Medium: 2,000 < = sales < 40,000 and 300 < = employees < =1,000; 
Large:   sales > 40,000 and employees > 1,000. 
 9 
Next, the classification of industry firm ownership is presented. Ownership 
definitions were first published by SSBC in 1996, and later improved in 2006.The 
definitions as follows2: 
 F1: State Owned Enterprise 
 F2: Collectively Owned Enterprise 
 F3: Private Enterprise  
 F4: Joint Economy & Share Holding Enterprise 
 F5: Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
 
The definitions and characteristics of Chinese SMEs are very important to note 
in this research, as these definitions differ from one country to the next. 
 
2.2 Financing problems for Chinese SMEs  
 
There is no sound system to ensure that SMEs obtain financing sources from 
banks. After the global financial crisis of 2008, the Chinese government 
implemented some policies emphasizing the creation of a more favorable 
financial environment for SMEs. In the first half of 2009, the country increased 
the total number of loans to enterprises by 3.9 trillion yuan, and the share of 
loans for SMEs rose to 56.6%. Yet this alone was not sufficient to resolve the 
credit constraints and the limited access to private finance. The use of formal 
finance is also limited. According to the All China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce (ACFIC) Survey of 2009, over 95% of SMEs cannot use formal 
financing options offered by State-Owned banks. Another issue is that many 
start-up firms and small businesses use self-accumulated money as their major 
financial source, but cannot get support from formal financial sources. Where 
information asymmetry exists, practically for start-ups and small enterprises, the 
                                            
2 There are 7 ownership groups in the 2006 definitions of SSBC: State-Owned Enterprise, 
Collectively Owned Enterprise, Private Enterprise, Joint Economy, Share Holding Economy, 
Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan, and Others. In order to facilitate the data analysis, the 7 groups were reduced to 5, 
merging Joint Economy and Share Holding Economy, and the Others group was dropped 
because there were very few data points in this group. 
 10 
problem in China is that there are fewer systems for SMEs to access collateral 
and guarantee their repayment ability to banks. Furthermore, there is no robust 
credit rating system for SMEs in China. A nationwide credit assessment system 
for SMEs is proposed to be put in place before 2020. Finally, there is a lack of 
market space and a mechanism for SMEs to obtain financial sources from 
financial markets by security issuance.  
 
This paper investigates the reality of SMEs’ financing situation in China, and the 
business model of relationship banking is checked to determine whether it 
affects financing for SMEs. 
 
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
3.1 Why relationship banking and what defines relationship banking? 
 
In order to define relationship banking, it must first be shown that there is 
informational asymmetry in financial intermediation, which is described clearly 
by Diamond (1984) and by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Relationship 
banking aims to resolve the problems of asymmetric information (Greenbaum 
(1998), Pertsen and Rajan (1992), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Boot (2000), 
Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004)). Moreover, with SMEs, there is a lack of 
transparent, audited financial records, which means they are more likely to have 
incomplete contracts. As such, the collection of information, and particularly soft 
information (Boot (2000)), is very important for both banks and firms.  
 
Most of modern research focuses on the role of banks as relationship lenders, 
but this research focuses on how borrowers improve the financial environment 
by developing closer relationships with banks over time. The definition of 
relationship banking is reviewed, and whether relationship banking can help 
when borrowers—particularly SMEs—face financial difficulties is examined.  
 
Relationship banking is defined to be not only about close bank and borrower 
relationships, but its potential for use as a financial intermediary is also 
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examined. We use the definition by Boot (2000), who considers relationship 
banking as the provision of a financial intermediary:  
“ⅰ) investing in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in 
nature; and ⅱ) evaluating the profitability of these investments through multiple 
interactions with the same customer over time or products.” 
 
According to Berger (1999), relationship banking is present when the following 
three conditions are completed: The intermediary gathers readily available public 
information, banks gather information about borrowers over time, and the 
information is proprietary (soft information). Accordingly, relationship banking is 
defined in this paper as follows: 
1. Banks invest in obtaining customer-specific information (soft information), 
often proprietary in nature. 
2. Firms borrow from the same bank over time，obtaining favorable conditions, in 
exchange for providing soft information. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis and literature review 
 
In this section, the literature on relationship banking is reviewed and the 
hypotheses to be tested in this paper are presented. Firstly, the merits of 
relationship banking are surveyed. Based on the definition of relationship 
banking, the collection of soft information is one of the merits for relationship 
banking. The following hypotheses are proposed:  
Hypothesis 1: In a long-term relationship, lenders can collect more soft 
information, which mitigates the problem of information asymmetry, and as a 
result, borrowers, particularly SMEs, receive financial support from the banks. 
Hypothesis 2: Borrowers (SMEs) can enjoy more favorable conditions from 
banks, including paying lower interest rates or pledging less collateral, by 
forming long-term relationships that ensure their trustworthiness. 
 
Previous research has illustrated the merits of relationship banking. Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) find that firms that build close ties with an institutional creditor 
will increase have greater access to financing. Berger and Udell (1995) establish 
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that the bank-borrower relationship is an important mechanism for solving the 
problems of asymmetric information; they also find that borrowers with longer 
banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are required pledge less 
collateral.  
 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) study the availability of housebanks for borrowers. 
Theoretically, housebanks are closely related to relationship banking, and they 
find that housebanks provide liquidity insurance to borrowers whose ratings 
have deteriorated unexpectedly. Angelini, Salvo, and Ferri (1998) investigate the 
effects of bank-firm relationships on the cost and the availability of credit for 
small firms in Italy. They find that banks that have long-term customer 
relationships will increase their lending rates, but local cooperative banks will not 
increase the lending rates for their local members. Therefore closer customer 
relationships with local cooperative banks can help control the cost of credit for 
small businesses.   
 
Sakai, Uesugi, and Watanabe (2010) investigate how the borrowing costs of 
firms decrease as they age, using the same approach used to measure interest 
rates. They find that interest rates fall as firms age and the borrower relationship 
grows.Similarly, Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale (2007) use the life cycle model of 
borrowing firms to test how bank-borrower relationships reduce the problems of 
asymmetric information and how this affects interest rates. They find that banks 
will provide lower interest rates for younger firms, but when firms surpass the 
10-year mark, the bank may increase rates. Only when the firm reaches 40 
years old does the bank lower its interest again. This is because the problem of 
asymmetric information is different between younger and older firms. This 
evidence is consistent with the theory of relationship banking. However, they 
also show that when the firm is more than 10 years old, the interest rate also 
increases because of the hold-up problem. Thus, the next hypotheses relate to 
the demerits of relationship banking: 
Hypothesis 3: One of the costs of a long-term relationship is the soft-budget 
constraint problem. Boot (2000) describes the key question of the soft-budget 
constraint problem as “whether a bank could deny additional credit when a 
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borrower falls into a situation of financial difficulty and exerts insufficient effort in 
preventing a bad outcome from happening”.   
Hypothesis 4: Another cost of relationship banking is the hold-up problem, 
which is caused when the borrower’s information is locked-in with lenders. 
Banks can take advantage of monopolistic rents from secure informational 
relationships. 
 
These two hypotheses describe the costs to firms that build long-term 
relationships with banks, and the theories of these demerits in relationship 
banking have been well documented in the literature. Greenbaum, Kanatas, and 
Venezia (1989) argue that banks collect soft information through the provision of 
financial services to firms over the long-term. The banks will then offer their 
expected loan rates, but for the borrower the cost increases. Sharpe (1990) finds 
that banks offer better-performing customers more competitive rates using an 
information monopoly, but at a high cost for customers. Sharpe (1990) also 
argues that banks will use the power of information monopoly to build their 
reputation, which translates into costs for customers and hold-up issues. Rajan 
(1992) also presents the costs of the hold-up problem. Because banks have 
bargaining power in a long-term borrower relationship, which can manage 
financial assets when the banks start with a project funding. For firms, their 
portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice to manage financial assets 
will be costly. 
 
Degryse and Cayseele (2000) find that firms that have longer relationships with 
banks pay higher loan rates, but less augment for collateral requirement with 
numbers of using banks. Onena and Smith (2001) compare the number of 
banking relationships held by firms. They find that firms that have relationships 
with multiple banks reduce the risk of being held up by banks, while firms who 
have long-term relationships with only one bank can more easily be locked in 
with lenders.Kano, Uchida, Udell and Watanabe (2011) use three 
factors—information verifiability, bank size and credit availability, and the level of 
competition in the banking sector—to analyze how relationship lending affects 
loan contract terms and credit availability. They find that in longer relationships 
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with small banks, firms can obtain the benefits of reduced loan interest rates and 
increased credit availability. However, with the improvement of financial 
environment of firms’, the costs increase either. With additional competition in 
the banking sector, stronger relationships bring firms to the hold up situation 
more easily. 
 
4 Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Description of the survey 
 
The data in this paper comes from a survey that examines the soft information of 
SMEs in Zhejiang province and their relationships with banks. The survey is part 
of a study about China conducted by Kato of Kobe University and Tang of Chuo 
University in 2010, entitled “A Study on Urbanization and Regional Economic 
Development. ” They conducted primary interviews with 183 firms, almost SMEs 
in the Shaoxing, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Jiashan, and Huzhou areas of Zhejiang 
province. These were manufacturing firms producing textiles, apparel, footwear, 
and hats.  The survey questions were  divided into five categories: ⅰ) basic 
information, ⅱ) spatial distribution information, ⅲ) territory evaluation, ⅳ) 
financial accounting information, and ⅴ ) relationships with banks. 
Questionnaires were received with a response rate of 93.9%. The data were 
cleaned and the final sample size for this study is 169 firms.        
 
4.2 Detailed outline and key concepts  
 
As mentioned in Section 3, this research aims to test the merits and demerits of 
relationship banking in China. Like most empirical papers, this study will 
measure relationship banking using the length of the bank-borrower relationship 
and the number of banks used by firms. One of the key questions asked in the 
survey is, “What do you think of the financing environment for firms and your 
ability to access financing?” The respondents were asked to provide an answer 
based on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 representing easy access and 4 representing 
difficult access. Difficulty level is one of the key dependent variables in this study. 
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Figure 1 shows the responses to the question of access to financing by firm size 
(sales). Firms with sales fewer than 100 million show that access to finance is 
more difficult than for larger firms. Another key dependent variable is interest 
rate. The performance variables of other firms are used to test the effects on the 
level of difficulty and interest rate. 
  
    
 
  
4.3 The definition of key concepts and the summary statistics  
 
Table 1 provides the definitions of variables used in this paper. The dependent 
variables are difficulty and interest rate. The firms’ performance variables are 
control variables, and the key independent variables are dummy variables, one 
group representing the number of lending banks (i.e. the concentration of 
relationship banking), and the other group is bank trade years, which describes 
the length of a bank-borrower relationship. Table 2 presents the mean, standard 
deviation, and min/max values of the key variables, and Table 3 shows the 
predicted sign of the main variables. 
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Table  1  Definition of variables 
Variables Description 
Difficulty Dependent variableFinancing access difficulty level of 14, where 4 represents the 
most difficult accessdifficult Interest rate Dependent variableLoan interest rate 
Years Operating years  
Lendingbank_nums The numbers of banks get loans 
BNUM_1 Dummy variable (number of relationships with banks = 1) 
BNUM_2~4 Dummy variable (bank numbers > = 2 & bank numbers < = 4) 
BNUM_5 Dummy variable (bank numbers > = 5) 
Pay_G Accounts payable / sales 
Growth_rate The growth rate of sales in the last 3 years 
LA Total liability / total assets in 2009  
BANK_L Bank loan / total liability 
Hypothecated_loan Dummy variable representing whether the firm had a hypothecated demand from the 
bank  Credit_loan Dummy variable representing whether the firm had a credit loan from the bank 
Earning Dummy variable expressing the firm’s earning level from 20072009 
E1 Dummy variable representing firms that have had profits for two years 
E2 Dummy variable representing firms who had a financial deficit but began making a profit 
E3  Dummy variable representing firms that had a profit but became a financial deficit 
E4 Dummy variable representing firms that have had a financial deficit for 2 years 
Firmsize Dummy variable representing firm size 
Firm_B Dummy variable for large firms 
 Firm_M Dummy variable for medium firms 
Firm_S Dummy variable for small firms 
Bank_tradeyears Length of service at the same bank  
Under1Y Dummy variable representing less than 1 year 
Above_1y_under3ys Dummy variable representing 13 years of (…) 
Above_3ys_under5ys Dummy variable representing 35 years 
Above5ys Dummy variable representing more than 5 years 
HL E1Above5ys 
BL E4Above5ys 
GE E1BNUM_1 
BE E4BNUM_1 
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     Table 2  Summary statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Difficulty 107 2.573 0.727 1 4 
Interest rate 107 5.621 0.417 4.58 7.25 
Years 107 8.365 6.839 0 58 
Lendingbank_nums 107 2.299 1.399 1 5 
BNUM_1 107 0.368 N.A. 0 1 
BNUM_2~4 107 0.456 N.A. 0 1 
BNUM_5 107 0.176 N.A. 0 1 
Pay_G 107 0.143 0.387 -0.174 4 
Groth_rate 107 13.916 13.516 -30 100 
LA 107 0.436 0.605 0 6.25 
BANK_L 107 0.583 0.76 0 8 
Hypothecated_loan 107 0.626 N.A. 0 1 
Credit_loan 107 0.286 N.A. 0 1 
E1 107 0.775 N.A. 0 1 
E2 107 0.159 N.A. 0 1 
E3  107 0.050 N.A. 0 1 
E4 107 0.049 N.A. 0 1 
Firm_B 107 0.077 N.A. 0 1 
Firm_M 107 0.582 N.A. 0 1 
Firm_S 107 0.341 N.A. 0 1 
Under1Y 107 0.076 N.A. 0 1 
Above_1y_under3ys 107 0.171 N.A. 0 1 
Above_3ys_under5ys 107 0.188 N.A. 0 1 
Above5ys 107 0.565 N.A. 0 1 
HL 107 0.465 N.A. 0 1 
BL 107 0.024 N.A. 0 1 
GE 107 0.280 N.A. 0 1 
BE 107 0.033 N.A. 0 1 
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Table 3 Predicted signs of the main variables 
Variables 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Difficulty Interest Difficulty Interest Difficulty Interest 
Years   
Control Control Control Control 
Lendingbank_nums 	  	  
BNUM_1   
BNUM_2~4 	  	  
BNUM_5 	  	  
Pay_G   
Groth_rate   
LA 	  	  
BANK_L   
Hypothecated_loan   
Credit_loan   
E1   
E2   
E3  	  	  
E4 	  	  
Firm_B   
Firm_M   
Firm_S 	  	  
Under1Y 	  	  
Above_1y_under3ys 	  	  
Above_3ys_under5ys   
Above5ys   
HL 
No  No  
Control Control 
	  	  
GE 	  	  
BL   
Control  Control  
BE   
Notes: HL,BL,GE,BE are cross variables to check Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. If the coefficients of BL and BE are 
negative and significant, it may indicate the soft-budget problem. If HL and GE are positive and significant, it may show 
the hold-up problem. Description of the variables are shown in Table 1. 
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4.4 Methodology 
 
This section describes the models used to analyze the effects of relationship 
banking on the level of difficulty to access financing and interest rate. The 
production function is given by: 
 
3 4
6 7 8
9 10 11 12
_
_ _
0 1 2
5
i i
Difficulty  =   β + β Years + β Lendingbank_nums+ β  Pay G+ β  Grothrate
(Interest)      + β LA + Bank L+ Hypothecated loan Credit_loan
                    + HL BL GE BE Earning +α Firmsize
   
β β β
β β β β π
+
+ + + +
i i                 + Bank_tradeyears+ u            θ
 
Where the difficulty is an index to show the firm’s financing environment and its 
level of difficulty to access financing, on a scale of 1 to 4. The interest rate shows 
the cost of bank loans. The relationship characteristics are the two groups of 
dummy variables, lending bank numbers and bank trade years. The other firm 
characteristics are controlled by the regression. This model is used to run the 
regression on our data, and the results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. 
Firstly, we focus on Table 4 that shows the estimation using the ordered logistic 
model on the Difficulty variable. A positive and significant coefficient is found for 
the number of lending banks used by firms. A larger number of lending banks 
shows weaker relationships between banks and firms, and the weaker the 
relationships, the more likely the financing environment becomes difficult. The 
coefficient for trade year group is negative and significant, which proves that the 
longer the relationships between banks and firms, the better the financing 
environment becomes. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
 
Next, the cross variables are checked for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. The 
definitions of the cross variables are reviewed here. Where HL is defined as the 
most profitable firms, multiplied by the longest relationships. BL is defined as 
firms with the largest financial deficits, multiplied by the longest relationships. GE 
is defined as the most profitable firms, multiplied by the number of banks get 
loans just for one. Similarly, BE is defined as firms with the largest financial 
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deficits, multiplied by the number of banks get loans just for one. If the 
coefficients of BL and BE are negative and significant, it can be speculated that 
firms with poor financial performance still can obtain financing because of their 
long term relationships thus indicating the soft-budget problem. On the other 
hand, if the coefficients of HL and GE are positive and significant, it can be 
speculated that a hold-up problem may exist. This could be problematic, as 
well-performing firms may find it difficult to obtain bank loans. 
Table 4  Results of the order logistic regression with the Difficulty variable  
  Ordered logistic 
Variables Difficulty 
  Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E 
Years ‐0.094 ** 0.041  -0.096  ** 0.041  -0.097  ** 0.042  -0.097  ** 0.042  
Lendingbank_nums 0.664  *** 0.225  0.680  *** 0.229  0.593  ** 0.308  0.645  ** 0.315  
Pay_G -0.668  
 
1.076  -0.426   1.114  -0.523  
 
1.066  -0.289  
 
1.106  
Groth_rate 0.031  * 0.016  0.036  ** 0.017  0.022  
 
0.019  0.028  
 
0.019  
LA -0.027  
 
0.368  -0.016   0.360  -0.052  
 
0.386  -0.029  
 
0.371  
BANK_L -0.204  
 
0.253  -0.184   0.257  -0.188  
 
0.256  -0.162  
 
0.259  
Hypothecated_loan -1.034  * 0.564  -0.955  * 0.580  -1.158  ** 0.591  -1.080  * 0.610  
Credit_loan -1.493  
 
0.587  -1.435  ** 0.606  -1.551  *** 0.615  -1.490  ** 0.633  
E1 (Omitted) 
 
  (Omitted)    (Omitted) 
 
  (Omitted) 
  
E2 1.070  * 0.704  1.521  * 0.853  0.924  
 
0.790  1.488  * 0.943  
E3  1.967  
 
1.038  3.017  ** 1.319  1.879  * 1.119  3.040  ** 1.410  
E4 1.521  
 
0.798  0.691   1.235  3.214  ** 1.635  2.369  
 
1.985  
Firm_B -16.730  
 
1416.1
68  
-16.034   987.15
2  
-17.071  
 
1586.20
9  
-17.076  
 
1601.30
7  Firm_M -0.953   
0.506  -0.973   0.513  -1.006  
 
0.514  -0.989  * 0.519  
Firm_S (Omitted) 
 
  (Omitted)
d) 
   (Omitted) 
 
  (Omitted) 
  
Above5ys -2.195  ** 0.965  -3.707  ** 1.576  -2.222  ** 1.000  -3.738  ** 1.595  
Above_3ys_under5y
s 
-1.615  * 1.010  -1.667  * 1.030  -1.573  * 1.037  -1.621  * 1.054  
Above_1y_under3ys -2.007  ** 1.037  -2.154  ** 1.054  -2.087  ** 1.069  -2.197  ** 1.083  
Under1Y (Omitted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  (Omitted)     (Omitted)     (Omitted)     
HL   
 
 
 
1.528   
 
 
 
 
1.290    1.584   
1.303  
BL 3.055  * 1.920 
 
 
  
2.855  * 1.984  
GE   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.126  
 
0.779  0.024  
 
0.783  
BE -2.424  
 
1.950  -2.094  
 
1.968  
   
Pseudo R2  0.240  0.253 0.247 0.260  
OBS 107 107 107 107 
Notes: Standard errors in behind, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables in all the regressions are dummy variables. 
 
Renewal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All the regressions use the ordered logistic model. Description of the variables are shown in Table 1. OBS is the number 
of samples. Pseudo R2 measures the model’s goodness of fit.  
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According to the explanation of cross variables, the results in Table 4 are not 
consistent with the hypothesis about the demerits of relationship banking. 
Although the coefficients of BL are significant, the signs are opposite from the 
conjecture. Table 5 reports the OLS regression on interest rate.  
 
Table 5 The results of OLS regression with Interest  
 
 
 
  
Variables 
  
OLS 
Interest 
Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E Coef.   S.E 
Years 0.005  
 
0.005  -0.002  
 
0.006  -0.002  
 
0.006  -0.002  
 
0.006  
Lendingbank_nums -0.053  * 0.033  -0.049  * 0.033  -0.076  * 0.044  -0.069  * 0.045  
Pay_G -0.271  * 0.174  -0.262  * 0.175  -0.262  * 0.176  -0.255  
 
0.177  
Groth_rate 0.003  
 
0.003  0.004  
 
0.003  0.002  
 
0.003  0.003  
 
0.003  
LA 0.008  
 
0.054  0.001  
 
0.055  0.006  
 
0.054  -0.001  
 
0.055  
BANK_L 0.052  
 
0.046  0.053  
 
0.047  0.049  
 
0.047  0.049  
 
0.047  
Hypothecated_loan -0.044  
 
0.080  -0.023  
 
0.082  -0.055  
 
0.083  -0.034  
 
0.085  
Credit_loan 0.067  
 
0.082  0.084  
 
0.084  0.059  
 
0.084  0.076  
 
0.085  
E1 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
  
E2 -0.033  
 
0.112  -0.018  
 
0.142  -0.075  
 
0.125  -0.057  
 
0.155  
E3  0.009  
 
0.169  0.058  
 
0.211  -0.024  
 
0.176  0.024  
 
0.218  
E4 0.408  *** 0.143  0.192  
 
0.236  0.403  
 
0.281  0.184  
 
0.346  
Firm_B 0.047  
 
0.161  0.035  
 
0.162  0.031  
 
0.163  0.022  
 
0.164  
Firm_M 0.186  ** 0.083  0.172  ** 0.084  0.174  ** 0.085  0.162  * 0.086  
Firm_S (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
  
Above5ys -0.074  
 
0.171  -0.136  
 
0.249  -0.108  
 
0.178  -0.158  
 
0.253  
Above_3ys_under5ys -0.231  
 
0.185  -0.217  
 
0.189  -0.261  
 
0.191  -0.244  
 
0.195  
Above_1y_under3ys 0.044  
 
0.190  0.044  
 
0.190  0.017  
 
0.194  0.022  
 
0.195  
Under1Y (omitted)     (omitted)     (omitted)     (omitted)     
HL 
  
0.061  
 
0.198  
  
0.053  
 
0.200  
BL 0.420  
 
0.338  0.399  
 
0.343  
GE 
  
-0.096  
 
0.120  -0.083  
 
0.121  
BE -0.069    0.345  -0.043    0.347  
Constant 5.631  *** 5.200  5.606  *** 0.202  5.775  *** 0.272  5.731  *** 0.276  
Pseudo R2 / R² 0.270  0.136 0.275 0.287  
Observations 107  107 107 107 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The coefficients on lending bank numbers are negative and significant, 
suggesting that the more lending banks are used, the easier it is for firms to 
obtain financing from them. This may support bank competition theory in the 
banking sector, but is not consistent with the hypothesis in this paper. Likewise, 
the results from the cross variables are inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper aimed to verify the effectiveness of the relationship banking business 
model for Chinese SMEs in financial distress. Data from Zhejiang province in 
China was used to verify four hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Using long-term relationships, lenders can collect more soft 
information, which mitigates the information asymmetry problem and achieves a 
higher lending performance for borrowers (particularly SMEs). 
Hypothesis 2: Borrowers (SMEs) can enjoy more advantageous conditions from 
banks, including lower interest rates and less collateral, by using long-term 
relationships which assures their trustworthiness.  
Hypothesis 3: One of the costs of long-term banking relationships is the 
soft-budget constraint problem. Boot (2000) describes the key question of 
soft-budget constraints as whether a bank could deny additional credit when a 
borrower falls into financial difficulty and exert insufficient efforts to prevent a bad 
outcome.   
Hypothesis 4: Another cost of relationship banking is the hold-up problem, which 
is caused by information lock-in with lenders. Banks can enjoy the advantageous 
monopolistic rents from secure informational relationships. 
 
This study found that there are clear merits to relationship banking, and thus 
relationship banking is an effective method for SMEs to raise capital in China. 
Therefore, it is recommended that relationship banking be promoted more 
heavily. A future topic of study would be to examine how to improve the demerits 
of relationship banking in China.  
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Chapter 2 
Trade Credit in China: 
Panel Evidence Based on the Survey of Industrial Enterprises 
Yajing Liu1 
 
Abstract 
Firms use trade credit with their partners more frequently as a financing method than 
other options with financial institutions2. In China, there are three main modes for 
corporate finance: Bank loans, security issuance, and trade credit. Compared to bank 
loans and security issuance, trade credit between business partners is a more 
important method for corporations, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, this study finds that SMEs, 
and particularly small firms, are more likely to use trade credit as a financing source 
than formal financial channels from financial institutions. A clear distinction is made 
between the trade credit of suppliers and demanders, and the relationship of each 
group is estimated using both trade credit and bank loans. If the coefficient of the 
variable is negative and significant, it will suggest that there is a substitute 
relationship between trade credit and bank loans. And if the coefficient is positive and 
significant, it suggests that there is a complementary relationship between trade 
credit and bank loans. The evidence suggests that small firms use more trade credit, 
and have a stronger substitute relationship with using financial institutions. It is also 
found that ownership may not affect the use of trade credit.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
Trade credit is a useful financial resource for enterprises, particularly for SMEs in 
China3. But what is the relationship between trade credit and bank loans? When 
enterprises are unable to obtain external financing from banks, will they increase 
trade credit with their business partners? Or, if they are unable to obtain bank loans, 
                                            
1 Graduate School of Economics, KOBE University. Liu_yajingdekiru@yahoo.co.jp 
2 Theories based on Petersen and Rajan (1997).  
3 See Ge and Qiu (2007), which describes the reality of trade credit in China. 
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will they also have difficulty in obtaining trade credit? Alternatively, are enterprises 
obtaining financing from banks and simultaneously extending trade credit? There are 
many theoretical explanations concerning trade credit. This paper focuses on the 
relationship between trade credit and formal financing channels.  
 
This study begins with a general survey of the literature on substitution hypotheses for 
trade credit and bank loans. Trade credit may provide better access to capital for 
firms than formal financial channels. In this case, it can be said that trade credit and 
bank loans have a substitute relationship, in particular for firms with weak banking 
relationships (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). Melzer (1960) shows that when firms cut 
back on their spending, these firms, particularly the larger ones, may use a credit 
policy as an alternative to direct price reductions, in order to increase their sales. 
Danielson and Scott (2004) provide evidence that firms will increase their reliance on 
trade credit when banks do not provide loans. Niskanen, J., and Niskanen, M. (2006) 
find that larger and older firms, and firms with strong internal financing sources, have 
a lower propensity to use trade credit, but that small firms and younger medium-sized 
firms with high growth rates tend to rely more heavily on trade credit. Guariglia and 
Matent (2006) use a panel of UK firms to test whether the trade credit channel offsets 
the credit channel. They find that both trade credit and credit are being used, and they 
also test operate as well as firms’ coverage ratio, but find that it does not affect 
inventory investments that are made using trade credit. Their results are consistent 
with Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). Bougheas, Mateut, and Mizen 
(2009) examine a ten-year dataset of UK industrial firms. They find that short-term 
bank loans have a direct negative effect on trade credit. Molina and Preve (2012) 
analyze how financial distress affects firms’ decisions to use trade credit with their 
suppliers. Their results show that firms in financial distress will use trade credit more 
frequently with their suppliers, which is expensive and adds to their costs of financial 
distress.  
 
Next, this study examines whether firms can obtain loans from banks while also using 
trade credit in other words, whether the two modes have a complementary 
relationship. 
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Cook (1999) analyzes data from a survey of 352 firms in Russia, and finds that firms 
who use trade credit also have a higher probability of obtaining bank credit. Giannetti, 
Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) analyze trade credit to develop the characteristics and 
aspects of bank-firm relationships. They find that trade credit is most likely facilitated 
by uninformed lenders, and firms prefer to accept cheaper trade credit for longer 
periods. They also conclude that suppliers prefer short-term contracts in order to give 
incentives (for example, provide discounts, give a low cost contract. act.) to firms. 
This finding also provides insight about the asymmetric information between banks 
and firms, which can be alleviated by trade credit by incorporating into the lending 
relationship private information held by suppliers about the firms’ customers. This is 
also consistent with Biais and Gollier (1997).   
 
There are also other theoretical explanations about substitution and complementation 
hypothesis between trade credit and bank loans. Gana, Mateus, and Teixeira (2008) 
use a panel dataset of Portuguese and Spanish SMEs to test the hypothesis of 
whether trade credit could be a substitute or a complementary resource to bank credit. 
They find that trade credit complements bank credit. Further, they show that younger 
and smaller firms have a greater tendency to access more credit, because trade 
credit makes private information about suppliers available to the bank, which allows 
the bank to have more intelligence about their customers, which in turn helps them 
make their credit decisions. However, they also point out that although the 
substitution result is proven by their dataset, the substitution and complementation 
hypothesis will be different based on the firms’ attributes. Alphonse, Ducret, and 
Séverin (2006) test whether bank debt and trade credit exist as two complementary 
sources of financing. Their results show that trade credit and bank debt have a 
negative correlation in accordance with substitution hypothesis. This is also 
consistent with Berger and Udell (1998). But their results also prove that trade credit 
can signal a firm’s quality, and this may help firms obtain more bank loans.  
 
In addition, Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) discuss the effects of financial 
crises on trade credit. They find that firms increase their use of trade credit right after 
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a financial crisis in order to delay their repayment periods. But this trend declines in 
the two years following the crisis. The reason may be associated with trade credit 
suppliers who are unable to obtain loans from banks as a result of the crisis. They 
suggest that more attention should be paid to the “redistribution view” of the supplier 
of trade credit, rather than conducting a simple analysis of substitution and 
complementation hypothesis between trade credit and bank loans. Fisman and Love 
(2003) use data for 37 industries in 43 countries to estimate each industry’s 
dependence on external finance. They find that industries are more dependent on 
trade credit in countries where financial institutions are less developed.  
 
Finally, there are studies on trade credit in China. Brandt and Zhu (2000) examine 
three features of China’s economic reform, namely economic decentralization, the 
government’s commitment to the state sector, and the credit plan and credit control. 
They note that the Chinese government helps inefficient state firms by providing them 
with cheap credit. They also show that when the government continues to support 
inefficient state enterprises, these enterprises become weak, which leads to an 
inflation problem.    
 
Cull and Xu (2003) discuss the determinants of the distribution of credit, which is 
provided by state owned banks to state owned enterprises. They find a positive 
relationship between bank financing and the profitability of state owned enterprises. 
They also show that from the 1980s to the 1990s, this relationship weakened 
because state owned enterprises used bank credit instead of getting direct support 
from the government. Franklin (2005) provides a comparison between formal and 
non-formal financing approaches of state owned firms and non-state owned firms in 
China, concluding that non-formal financing approaches sustain the growth of 
non-state owned firms in China. Ge and Qiu (2007) focus on non-state owned firms in 
China, particularly those with limited support from banks. By comparing the use of 
trade credit by state owned firms and non-state owned firms in China, they find that 
the latter use trade credit more often. This suggests that non-formal financing 
channels support the growth of non-state firms. Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2009) use a large 
dataset of Chinese industrial firms and show that unprofitable state owned firms are 
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more likely to obtain formal credit, although with a poorly performing. These state 
owned firms may then provide trade credit to their customers who are unable to 
access formal credit or bank loans. The authors also point out that a biased and 
inefficient banking system may be the main reason for the increased substitution of 
trade credit. However, they do not find strong evidence that trade credit has a 
significant impact on the growth of China’s enterprises. 
 
Building on these studies about the substitution and complementation hypothesis 
between trade credit and bank loans, this paper offers the advantage of using 
unbalance panel data for China. This study also contributes to the literature by 
dividing the analysis by trade credit supplier and trade credit demander. These 
groups are then applied to estimate the relationship between using trade credit and 
using financial institutions. Finally, this research also conducts a time series analysis 
over a five-year period.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
basic information about the panel data. Section 3 discusses the empirical evidence of 
testing the substitution and complementation hypothesis between trade credit and 
bank loans. Section 4 presents the conclusions and the implications of these results, 
along with some ideas for future research.   
 
2 Data and summary statistics 
 
This dataset is drawn from the annual accounting reports provided by HUAMEI 
Enterprise of Statistics of China. This survey provides industrial enterprise surveys 
covering state owned firms and non-state owned firms from 2004 to 2008. All firms 
with sales lower than 1,000 yuan were dropped from the sample, so that firms cannot 
show negative values for sales. The total number of key variables is around 330,000.  
 
Table 1 provides the definitions of the key variables used in this paper. The 
dependent variable is trade credit. Accounts payable and accounts receivable are 
used to represent trade credit, and these trade credit values are divided by the groups 
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of suppliers and demanders, respectively. Thus, the accounts payable variable 
represents the demanders of trade credit (i.e. the firm’s customers), while the 
accounts receivable variable represents the suppliers of trade credit to the firm. 
Long-term liability is used to represent bank loans. Moreover, in order to avoid 
economies of scale, the ratio of all dependent variables and long-term liability is taken 
over total sales, and the ratio of all dependent variables and long-term liability is taken 
over total assets.  
 
In order to examine the effect of firm size and ownership structure on productivity and 
financial sources, dummy variable groups are created. First, the definitions for 
industry firm size used by the State Statistics Bureau of China (SSBC) 2011 are 
presented, as follows: 
Small:  300 < = sales < 2,000 (10,000CNY units) and employees < 300; 
Medium: 2,000 < = sales < 40,000 and 300 < = employees < =1,000; 
Large:   sales > 40,000 and employees > 1,000. 
 
Second, the classification of industry firm ownership is introduced. Ownership 
definitions were first published by SSBC in 1996, and later refined in 2006. The 
HUAMEI dataset in this paper uses the 2006 definitions. The enterprise database is 
divided into the following five ownership groups4: 
 F1: State Owned Enterprise 
 F2: Collectively Owned Enterprise 
 F3: Private Enterprise  
 F4: Joint Economy & Share Holding Enterprise 
 F5: Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong    
    Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
 
                                            
4 There are 7 ownership groups in the 2006 definitions of SSBC: State-owned Enterprise, Collectively Owned Enterprise, Private 
Enterprise, Joint Economy, Share Holding Economy, Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, and Others. In order to facilitate the data analysis, the 7 groups were reduced to 5, merging Joint Economy and Share 
Holding Economy, and dropping the Others group because of the database had very few data points in this group. 
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Variables
PAY_sales_ratio
RE_sales_ratio
PAY_totassets_ratio
RE_totassets_ratio
NET_CA
NET_CS
Long_liability_sales_ratio  = long_term_liability / sales
Long_liability_totassets_ratio  = long_term_liability / total assets
Ln_ta  = log (total assets) 
Ln_sa  = log (sales)
Ln_stock  = log (stock)
Ln_N_W  = log (number of workers)
Operating_sales_ratio
Longlib_totlib_ratio
L_sales_S
L_sales_M
L_sales_L
L_sales_F1
L_sales_F2
L_sales_F3
L_sales_F4
L_sales_F5
L_totasset_S
L_totasset_M
L_totasset_L
L_totasset_F1
L_totasset_F2
L_totasset_F3
L_totasset_F4
L_totasset_F5
D_2004
D_2005
D_2006
D_2007
D_2008
 dependent variable = account payable / total assets
 = long_term_liability / total liability
Table1  Definition of variables 
Description
 dependent variable = account payable / sales
 dependent variable = account receivable / sales
 dependent variable = account payable / sales
Dummy variable =Long_liability_totassets_ratio * small firm size
 dependent variable =account receivable - account payable) / total assets
 dependent variable =account receivable - account payable) / sales
 = operating profit / sales
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * small firm size
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * medium firm size
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * large firm size
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * firm ownership of F1
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * firm ownership of F2
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * firm ownership of F3
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * firm ownership of F4
Dummy variable = Long_liability_sales_ratio * firm ownership of F5
Dummy variable = Long_liability_totassets_ratio*  firm ownership of F5
Dummy variable =Long_liability_totassets_ratio * medium firm size
Dummy variable =Long_liability_totassets_ratio * large firm size
Dummy variable = Long_liability_totassets_ratio*  firm ownership of F1
Dummy variable = Long_liability_totassets_ratio*  firm ownership of F2
Dummy variable = Long_liability_totassets_ratio*  firm ownership of F3
Dummy variable = Long_liability_totassets_ratio*  firm ownership of F4
Dummy variable for the year 2008
Dummy variable for the year 2004
Dummy variable for the year 2005
Dummy variable for the year 2006
Dummy variable for the year 2007
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Table 2 Summary statistics of key variables 
 KEY Variable 
         
  Type Obs Variable: PAY_sales
_ratio 
RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_rat
io 
NET_CA NET_CS Lib_sales_ra
tio 
Lib_totassets_r
atio 
operating_sale
s_ratio 
Longlib_tot
lib_ratio 
ln_sa ln_ta ln_stock ln_N_W 
All 
 
  325579 Mean 0.301 0.345 0.144 0.160 0.017 0.043 0.633 0.160 0.039 0.265 10.578 10.478 8.154 5.062 
 Std. Dev. 12.927 22.051 0.154 0.161 0.182 21.500 40.650 0.217 13.983 0.238 1.533 1.661 1.977 1.237 
 
                Firm_size Small 118545 Mean 0.590 0.693 0.153 0.178 0.025 0.103 1.347 0.179 -0.187 0.286 9.106 9.315 6.992 4.269 
Std. Dev. 21.418 36.540 0.162 0.170 0.199 35.630 67.352 0.222 23.173 0.246 0.655 0.998 1.498 0.813 
Medium 182377 Mean 0.138 0.149 0.140 0.155 0.015 0.011 0.224 0.150 0.044 0.258 11.083 10.782 8.465 5.286 
Std. Dev. 0.262 0.249 0.152 0.159 0.175 0.264 0.831 0.220 0.140 0.233 0.784 1.256 1.656 1.006 
Large 24657 Mean 0.123 0.113 0.124 0.113 -0.012 -0.010 0.230 0.138 0.063 0.222 13.924 13.816 11.444 7.211 
Std. Dev. 0.147 0.133 0.128 0.116 0.130 0.151 0.612 0.161 0.116 0.220 0.958 1.286 1.582 1.229 
Ownership State 30713 Mean 1.471 1.680 0.111 0.101 -0.011 0.209 4.009 0.223 -0.686 0.287 10.581 11.457 8.523 5.815 
Std. Dev. 41.716 66.569 0.138 0.111 0.147 64.985 131.746 0.316 45.171 0.256 2.251 1.974 2.467 1.536 
Collectively 16384 Mean 0.223 0.234 0.162 0.197 0.035 0.011 0.291 0.169 0.036 0.260 10.133 9.821 7.441 4.864 
Std. Dev. 2.557 2.407 0.181 0.181 0.220 0.681 2.907 0.214 0.193 0.240 1.249 1.266 1.723 1.048 
Private 224435 Mean 0.161 0.198 0.141 0.164 0.023 0.037 0.260 0.154 0.037 0.265 10.477 10.223 7.940 4.900 
Std. Dev. 1.295 9.866 0.150 0.167 0.183 9.560 3.804 0.204 1.071 0.235 1.392 1.554 1.885 1.159 
Joint 1346 Mean 0.382 0.498 0.148 0.162 0.014 0.116 0.664 0.188 -0.468 0.275 10.461 10.531 8.094 5.064 
Std. Dev. 2.543 5.312 0.151 0.156 0.177 3.395 7.038 0.213 12.783 0.249 1.466 1.556 1.804 1.105 
Foreign 52701 Mean 0.239 0.221 0.167 0.167 0.000 -0.018 0.361 0.147 0.006 0.257 11.150 11.196 9.076 5.373 
Std. Dev. 2.839 1.845 0.166 0.145 0.178 2.252 4.523 0.193 3.091 0.237 1.530 1.563 1.786 1.196 
Year 2004 61588 Mean 0.434 0.608 0.147 0.168 0.021 0.174 1.166 0.174 -0.081 0.261 10.227 10.334 8.067 5.108 
Std. Dev. 10.990 36.384 0.164 0.158 0.190 31.902 59.932 0.213 3.842 0.236 1.528 1.637 1.926 1.245 
2005 57069 Mean 0.299 0.364 0.143 0.161 0.018 0.066 0.530 0.168 -0.014 0.266 10.479 10.494 8.177 5.167 
Std. Dev. 5.649 20.130 0.150 0.153 0.178 19.805 9.498 0.194 1.405 0.237 1.542 1.653 1.972 1.245 
2006 57485 Mean 0.383 0.306 0.142 0.159 0.017 -0.077 0.923 0.166 -0.154 0.268 10.634 10.596 8.270 5.150 
Std. Dev. 23.922 10.432 0.156 0.188 0.187 20.143 72.125 0.319 32.422 0.238 1.560 1.677 1.990 1.250 
2007 62492 Mean 0.269 0.338 0.141 0.159 0.019 0.069 0.411 0.157 0.004 0.268 10.803 10.638 8.299 5.091 
Std. Dev. 13.563 27.324 0.145 0.155 0.174 25.831 12.659 0.180 4.088 0.237 1.519 1.685 2.006 1.248 
2008 86945 Mean 0.179 0.175 0.145 0.155 0.011 -0.004 0.292 0.143 0.021 0.265 10.694 10.375 8.021 4.880 
Std. Dev. 2.945 2.924 0.154 0.155 0.179 2.189 5.405 0.169 3.665 0.240 1.475 1.639 1.976 1.188 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 1 displays the variation in trade credit from 2004 to 2008, as represented by ln_pay = 
Ln (accounts payable), and ln_re = Ln (accounts receivable). 
From 2004 to 2007, trade credit experienced significant growthbut fell sharply 
between 2007 and 2008. It is speculated that this is due to the financial crisis of 2008. 
This phenomenon in China is different from the research of Love, Preve, and 
Sarria-Allende (2007), who found that firms decreased trade credit both before and 
after financial crises. Figure 2 describes total accounts receivable for China as a 
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whole, based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics. it is consistent with the 
dataset of this study. 
 
3 Model and analyses 
 
 3.1 Fixed effects of regression 
 
In this section, the substitution and complementation hypothesis between trade credit 
and bank loans is tested. The hypotheses are summarized as follows:   
Hypothesis 1: Trade credit may provide better access to capital for firms than 
intermediate financing sources. In this case, it is said that trade credit and bank loans 
have a substitute relationship, in particular for firms with weak banking relationships.  
Hypothesis 2: If firms can obtain loans from banks as well as trade credit, it is said 
that they have a complementary relationship with each other. 
 
The two hypotheses will be tested for Chinese industry enterprises. The production 
function is given by: 
 
 
Where  is the amount of trade credit for firm i in year t. There are four dependent 
variables to express , namely accounts payable/sales, accounts payable/total 
assets, accounts receivable/sales, and accounts receivable/total assets. Where the 
payable group offers trade credit and the receivable group supplies trade credit, is 
a firm-specific intercept. The ratio of operating profit over sales, the log value of sales, 
total assets, stock, and worker numbers are control variables to explain the firms’ 
characteristics. Firm size and firm ownership are dummy variables to report the size 
and ownership of Chinese industrial firms. Cross terms are created to cross the 
T .Cit =α 0i +α1 ln_ long_ liabilityit +α 2Operating_ sales_ ratioit +α 3 ln_ salesit +α 4 ln_ total _assetsit
+α 5 ln_ stockit +α 6 ln_N _Wit +α 7 ln_ long_ liability *  firm_ sizeit
+α 8 ln_ long_ liability *  firm_ownershipit +α 9Yeari + ε it
(i = 1,2,...N;t = t1,t2,...,t5 ) (3−1)
T .Cit
T .Cit
α 0i
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ownership dummy and the firm size dummy with the long-term liability variables, in 
order to find the features of Chinese industrial enterprises. Finally, the year dummy is 
used to control the fixed effects of other variables, as well as the year effects.  
 
Using function (3-1), the regression is run using the unbalanced dataset group and 
the balanced dataset group. The regression is divided into these two groups in order 
to check whether the signs of the variables are consistent. The results are 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Firstly, the demanders of trade credit are examined. Tables 3 and 4 report on the 
fixed effects analysis. Using the same dataset, the results from both the unbalanced 
and balanced groups are reported. In Table 3, Column 1 and Column 3 report the 
fixed effects tests on the accounts payable to sales radio, showing that SMEs are 
more likely to use trade credit, and that the coefficient is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. This may suggest that SMEs may substitute financing sources from 
institutions with trade credit. On the other hand, large firms may use trade credit as a 
complement to bank loans, as the coefficient for large firms is positive and significant.  
Secondly, the suppliers of trade credit are examined. In Table 3, Column 2 and 
Column 4 show the results of the receivable group, which represents the suppliers of 
trade credit. The coefficients of the variables L_totasset_S and L_totassets_M are 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The signs of the coefficients for both the 
demanders and suppliers of trade credit confirm the theory that there may be a 
substitute relationship between trade credit and bank loans (Hypothesis 1). 
 
The same results were not found for state owned enterprises or nor non-state owned 
firms. Although the results are significant, the coefficients have the opposite signs. 
Thus, it cannot be concluded that trade credit and bank loans have a complementary 
relationship based on the ownership structure of enterprises. Similar results are found 
with the balanced dataset group, and the results reported in Table 4. These findings 
suggest that SMEs use trade credit more often than bank loans. They also suggest 
that trade credit and bank loans have a simultaneity problem, so a Granger causality 
test is conducted to determine whether this is the case. 
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Table 3  Fixed effect with unbalance database
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
PAY_sales_ratio RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_ratio NET_CA NET_CS 
Lib_sales_ratio 0.124 0.004 -0.12
(0.090) (0.340) (0.340)
operating_sales_ratio -0.189*** -1.022*** -0.833***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
ln_ta -0.036 -0.068 -0.032
(0.030) (0.120) (0.120)
L_Sales_S 0.055 0.039 -0.016
(0.090) (0.330) (0.330)
L_Sales_M 0.006 0.036 0.030
(0.090) (0.320) (0.320)
L_sales_F1 0.418*** 0.583*** 0.165*  
(0.020) (0.070) (0.070)
L_sales_F3 -0.100*** -0.052 0.048
(0.020) (0.070) (0.070)
L_sales_F4 0.117 -0.284 -0.401
(0.070) (0.250) (0.250)
L_sales_F5 -0.063** 0.13 0.193** 
(0.020) (0.070) (0.070)
Lib_totalassets_ratio 0.197*** 0.271*** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln_sa -0.001* 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L_totasset_S -0.073*** -0.093*** -0.020*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_M -0.025*** 0.013* 0.038***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_F1 -0.071*** -0.132*** -0.061***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_F3 0.036*** 0.104*** 0.068***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.010)
L_totasset_F4 0.03 -0.036* -0.066**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
L_totasset_F5 -0.026*** -0.085*** -0.059***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Longlib_totlib_ratio -0.363*** -0.224 -0.220*** -0.202*** 0.018*** 0.139
(0.070) (0.270) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.270)
ln_stock 0.01 0.136* 0.004*** -0.010*** -0.015*** 0.126*  
(0.010) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050)
ln_N_W -0.067* -0.113 -0.003*** 0.002* 0.004*** -0.046
(0.030) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110)
D_2004 -0.047 -0.053 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005*** -0.006
(0.030) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 (0.120)
D_2005 0.017 0.074 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.057
(0.030) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110)
D_2006 -0.032 -0.074 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002* -0.041
(0.030) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110)
D_2007 0.003 0.06 0.001* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.056
(0.030) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100)
constant 0.796* 0.292 0.166*** 0.155*** -0.011 -0.504
(0.340) (1.230) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (1.230)
R-sqr 0.466 0.123 0.105 0.243 0.056 0.021
Number of grp_firm 163045 163045 163045 163045 163045 163045
Observations 325578 325578 325578 325578 325578 325578
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001
VARIABLES
UNBALANCE
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Table 4 Fixed effect with balance database
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
PAY_sales_ratio RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_ratio NET_CA NET_CS 
Lib_sales_ratio -0.324*** -0.096 0.229***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.050)
operating_sales_ratio -0.252*** -0.507*** -0.255***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000)
ln_ta -0.024 0.022 0.045*  
(0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Longlib_totlib_ratio -0.367*** -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.235*** -0.009** 0.138** 
(0.060) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040)
ln_stock 0.024* 0.004 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.020*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
ln_N_W -0.031 0.002 -0.002 0.002* 0.003** 0.033
(0.030) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
L_sales_S 0.361*** 0.116 -0.245***
(0.070) (0.060) (0.050)
L_sales_M 0.159* -0.001 -0.160** 
(0.070) (0.060) (0.050)
L_sales_F1 1.395*** 0.449*** -0.946***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
L_sales_F3 -0.04 0.058** 0.098***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
L_sales_F4 -0.3 -1.396*** -1.096***
(0.180) (0.160) (0.130)
L_sales_F5 0.047 0.368*** 0.321***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Lib_totalassets_ratio 0.211*** 0.329*** 0.119***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln_sa 0.0008 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L_totasset_S -0.049*** -0.078*** -0.029**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_M -0.022** 0.016* 0.038***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_f1 -0.013 -0.095*** -0.082***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_f3 0.024*** 0.081*** 0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_f4 -0.006 -0.039 -0.033
(0.030) (0.020) (0.030)
L_totasset_f5 -0.037*** -0.109*** -0.072***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
D_2004 -0.02 -0.001 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
D_2005 -0.01 -0.006 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
D_2006 -0.017 -0.002 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.015
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
D_2007 -0.025 -0.012 0.001* 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
constant 0.422 -0.052 0.144*** 0.153*** 0.009 -0.474*  
(0.270) (0.240) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.200)
R-sqr 0.294 0.270 0.138 0.352 0.089 0.307
Number of grp_firm 163276 163276 163276 163276 163276 163276
Observations 58326 58326 58326 58326 58326 58326
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001
VARIABLES
BALANCE
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3.2 Granger causality test and GMM analysis 
 
The variables were not lagged initially, because although the database is very large, it 
only covers a 5-year span. Now the Granger causality test is used to determine 
whether trade credit and bank loans have a simultaneity problem. Firstly, the following 
regression is run to test the correlation between bank loans and trade credit.  
T .Cit =α 0i +α1 ln_ long_ liabilityi,t−1 +α 2Operating_ sales_ ratioi,t−1 +α 3 ln_ salesi,t−1
+α 4 ln_ total _assetesi,t−1 +α 5 ln_ stocki,t−1 +α 6 ln_N _Wi,t−1 +α 7 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ sizei,t−1
+α 8 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ownershipi,t−1 + ε i,t−1 (3− 2)
 
Then, the following regression (3-3) is run to test the correlation between trade credit 
and bank loans. 
 
ln_ long_ liabilityit =α 0i +α1T .Ci,t−1 +α 2Operating_ sales_ ratioi,t−1 +α 3 ln_ salesi,t−1
+α 4 ln_ total _assetesi,t−1 +α 5 ln_ stocki,t−1 +α 6 ln_N _Wi,t−1
+α 7 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ sizei,t−1 +α 8 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ownershipi,t−1
+ ε i,t−1 (3− 3)
The results of the Granger causality test are reported in Table 5. It is observed that 
the correlation between bank loans and trade credit is almost negative and significant, 
but the correlation between trade credit and bank loans is also negative and 
significant. This may indicate a simultaneity problem. Thus, to avoid this issue, trade 
credit is lagged by one year. Using GMM in the following regression, the results are 
shown in Table 6. 
 
T .Cit =α 0i +α1T .Ci,t−1 +α 2 ln_ long_ liabilityit +α 3Operating_ sales_ ratioi,t−1 +α 4 ln_ salesit
+α 5 ln_ total _assetesit +α 6 ln_ stockit +α 7 ln_N _Wit +α 8 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ sizeit
+α 9 ln_ long_ liability* firm_ownershipit +α10Year + ε it (3− 4)
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Table 5 Results of the Granger causality test
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  
PAY_sales_ratio RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_ratio Lib_sales_ratio Lib_sales_ratio Lib_totalassets_ratio Lib_totalassets_ratio 
L.Lib_sales_ratio -0.095 -0.07
(0.110) (0.080)
L.PAY_sales_ratio 0.072***
(0.010)
L.RE_sales_ratio 0.150***
(0.010)
L.PAY_totassets_ratio -0.003
(0.000)
L.RE_totassets_ratio -0.008
(0.000)
L.Longlib_totlib_ratio -0.060 -0.050 -0.006 -0.008*  1.318*** 1.308***
(0.110) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.020)
L.operating_sales_ratio 0.102*** -0.230*** -0.053 -0.044 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.120) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000)
L.ln_ta 0.03 0.041 0.054 0.047
(0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.050)
L.ln_stock 0.011 0.006 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.032 -0.029 0.001 0.001
(0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000)
L.ln_N_W -0.084 -0.065* -0.003* 0 -0.132* -0.131* -0.015 -0.019
(0.050) (0.030) 0.000 0.000 (0.050) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000)
L.L_Sales_S 0.039 0.01 0.049 0.048
(0.110) (0.070) (0.040) (0.040)
L.L_Sales_M 0.038 0.036 0.047 0.052
(0.100) (0.070) (0.050) (0.050)
L.L_sales_F1 0.048 0.011 -0.150*** -0.148***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040)
L.L_sales_F3 0.056 0.027 0.112* 0.107*
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040)
L.L_sales_F4 2.725*** 3.466*** 8.574*** 8.311***
(0.280) (0.190) (0.320) (0.320)
L.L_sales_F5 0.055 0.062* -0.066 -0.084*
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040)
L.Lib_totalassets_ratio -0.002 0.006
(0.010) (0.010)
L.ln_sa -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.000) (0.000)
L.L_totasset_S 0.002 -0.001 -0.015* -0.015*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L.L_totasset_M 0.016 0.007 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L.L_totasset_F1 0.002 -0.004 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L.L_totasset_F3 -0.002 -0.004 0.020** 0.020*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L.L_totasset_F4 -0.019 -0.005 0.011 0.011
(0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
L.L_totasset_F5 -0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
constant 0.284 0.118 0.169*** 0.177*** 0.78 0.804 0.352*** 0.353***
(0.470) (0.320) (0.010) (0.010) (0.550) (0.550) (0.010) (0.010)
R-sqr 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.145 0.145 0.012 0.012
obs 146790 146790 146790 146790 146790 146790 146790 146790
groups 68368 68368 68368 68368 68368 68368 68368 68368
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001
VARIABLES
Bank loans to trade credit Trade credit to bank loans
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Table 6  Results of the GMM estimation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  
PAY_sales_ratio RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_ratio PAY_sales_ratio RE_sales_ratio PAY_totassets_ratio RE_totassets_ratio
L.PAY_sales_ratio -0.009* -0.004
(0.000) (0.000)
L.RE_sales_ratio 0.072*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000)
L.PAY_totassets_ratio 0.310*** 0.328***
(0.010) (0.010)
L.RE_totassets_ratio 0.370*** 0.396***
(0.010) (0.010)
Lib_totalassets_ratio 0.199*** 0.064*** 0.192*** 0.069***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
ln_sa 0.001 0.016*** 0.002 0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lib_sales_ratio 0.051 0.018 -0.354** -0.114*
(0.110) (0.050) (0.130) (0.050)
ln_ta 0.067 0.102*** -0.117** 0.025
(0.050) (0.020) (0.040) (0.020)
L_Sales_S 0.06 0.04 0.767*** 0.308***
(0.100) (0.050) (0.080) (0.030)
L_Sales_M 0.081 0.011 0.754*** 0.300***
(0.100) (0.050) (0.080) (0.030)
L_sales_F1 -0.107*** -0.078*** 1.756*** 0.424***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.100) (0.040)
L_sales_F3 0.387*** 0.044*** 0.302** 0.176***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.100) (0.040)
L_sales_F4 -0.037 -0.456*** -0.234 -1.097***
(0.220) (0.110) (0.250) (0.090)
L_sales_F5 -0.027 0.052*** -0.339** -0.191***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.100) (0.040)
L_totasset_S -0.041*** -0.001 -0.048*** -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_M -0.016 0.005 -0.026* -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_F1 -0.037** -0.033** -0.015 -0.026
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_F3 0.015 -0.01 0.013 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
L_totasset_F4 -0.075* -0.061*  -0.072 -0.058
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040)
L_totasset_F5 -0.041** -0.036** -0.041** -0.037** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Longlib_totlib_ratio -0.426*** -0.082 -0.218*** -0.063*** -1.055*** -0.382*** -0.205*** -0.064***
(0.100) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.030) (0.010) (0.000)
operating_sales_ratio -0.473*** -0.261*** 0.005 0.006 -0.448*** -0.512*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln_stock 0.019 -0.005 0.007*** -0.010*** 0.046** 0.004 0.007*** -0.011***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
ln_N_W -0.128** -0.155*** -0.001 -0.001 0.023 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.040) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.010) 0.000 0.000
D_2005 -0.035 0.013 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.016 0.020* 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
D_2006 -0.03 0.017 0.004*** 0.008*** -0.018 0.01 0.005*** 0.009***
(0.030) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
D_2007 -0.038 0.002 0.001 0.006*** -0.015 0.002 0.002* 0.006***
(0.030) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.072 -0.013 0.060*** 0.017 0.898* -0.091 0.039** 0.007
(0.480) (0.240) (0.010) (0.010) (0.450) (0.160) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of grp_firm 77326 77326 77326 77326 56727 56727 56727 56727
Observations 40,172 40,172 40,172 40,172 25,696 25,696 25,696 25,696
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001
VARIABLES
Unbalance Balance
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The data is presented in the same way, with the unbalanced and balanced groups. 
The results in Table 6 show that the coefficients of bank loans are almost negative 
and significant. Furthermore, in this model, the coefficients of pay_sales_ratio are 
also negative and significant. And the small-sized enterprises with long-term liability 
suggests a very strong negative effect on trade credit. In another words, this confirms 
the theory that trade credit and bank loans have a substitute relationship with each 
other (Hypothesis 1). Note that the simultaneity problem has been avoided by lagging 
trade credit, but the results regarding firms’ ownership were still mixed. A more 
in-depth knowledge about formal and informal financial sources may be required as a 
key to understanding the determinants of how and why firms extend trade credit.  
 
4 conclusions  
 
Using the panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, this study finds that SMEs prefer 
to use trade credit over bank loans. Unlike large firms, SMEs use trade credit as a 
substitute for bank loans. The analysis also finds that ownership does not determine 
whether there is a substitution or a complementation relationship between trade credit 
and bank loans. 
 
A clear distinction is made to examine trade credit by supplier and demander. 
However, no major differences were found between these groups. Thus, trade credit 
is still a very important financial source for enterprises in China. Compared to bank 
loans, trade credit between business partners may be more expected for SMEs.  
 
By testing the substitution and complementation hypotheses between trade credit and 
bank loans with this data, it was also noted that the substitution and complementation 
hypotheses may be different when firms’ attributes change. In the future, the 
determinants of trade credit should continue to be studied. 
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Chapter 3 
The productivity of Industrial Firms and Financial Efficiency in China 
Liu Yajing1 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the efficiency of financial sources by measuring 
productivity using firm-level panel data. First the effect of ownership and firm 
size on the productivity of Chinese industrial firms is studied. Then, the 
relationship between productivity and the financial source is analyzed. There 
are two financial sources for enterprises in our data, trade credit (TC) and 
bank loans. Long-term liabilities are used to represent bank loans, and 
accounts payable, accounts receivable and other relevant variables are used 
to represent trade credit. It is found that enterprises experienced productivity 
increases as a result of using more trade credit, but less bank loans. The 
ownership and size of firms in the industry were also measured, but there 
was no particularly powerful evidence that a firm’s ownership will affect the 
enterprise's productivity based on the financial source. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Financial sources and financial efficiency play a vital role in the growth of 
enterprises. This study focuses on how different financial sources affect the 
growth of enterprises.  
 
This research relates to two threads of literature. The first one is about how 
different financial sources affect the growth of enterprises. It has been well 
established that if capital markets are not fully developed, it is very difficult for 
many enterprises (particularly SMEs) to accumulate sufficient capital to build 
up factories, purchase machinery and equipment, hire workers, expand sales, 
and make a profit. Accordingly, if there is not a strong financing environment, 
it will constrain the development of enterprises. Fisman and Love (2003) 
provide evidence for this. They use data for 37 industries in each of 43 
countries to estimate every industry’s dependence on external finance, and 
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they find that industries are more dependent on trade credit financing in 
countries where financial markets are less developed. For this reason, this 
study has chosen to focus on the relationships between firms’ productivity 
and trade credit, and firms’ productivity and bank loans.   
 
The second thread of literature is about financial efficiency and enterprise 
productivity. There is an increasing number of studies that discuss the 
productivity of firms and economic growth in China over the past 30 years. 
Because productivity is not directly observable, many studies either measure 
the total factor productivity (TFP) and assess the progress of research and 
development (R&D), or they focus on efficiency improvement, firms’ financial 
performances, or multifactor productivity and so on. The papers describing 
this topic are considerable.  
 
Many researchers are interested in observing productivity changes in 
Chinese industries. For example, Chen, Wang & Zhang (1988) investigate 
the productivity growth of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) between 
1953~1985, building on past studies which showed that the Chinese 
industrial sector was “zero productive”. They found long-term productivity 
growth was 1.3% during this period. However, Woo, Hai, Jin & Fan (1994) 
use data on SOEs and collectively owned enterprises (COEs), which include 
urban collectives, county collectives, and town and village enterprises (TVEs) 
to measure the TFP. They find zero TPF growth in SOEs over the 1984~1988 
period, and positive TFP growth in COEs over the same period.  
 
These studies were conducted before the reform of SOEs in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The biggest change was to allow Chinese enterprises to 
ease into market competition. As these reform policies took place, SOEs 
adapted to the new environment. Chow & Lin (2002) and Chow (2008) 
provide evidence that Chinese TPF growth was zero in the 1952~1978 period, 
but rose to 2.7% after 1979. Perkins & Rawski (2008) determined TFP growth 
in China to be 0.5% between 1952 and 1978, and 3.8% in the 1978~2005 
period. Anming Z., Yimin Z., & Zhao (2002) found that SOEs’ financial 
performance had a significant effect on their productivity, but had a lesser 
impact on their profitability compared to enterprises with other ownership 
structures in the 1996~1998 period.  
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There are also some studies that discuss financing sources and firms’ 
performances by industry (such as Long & Zhang, 2011); some estimate 
productivity growth and industrial transformation by measuring structural 
change (Chen, Jefferson & Zhang, 2010), while others assess the growth of 
TFP by categorizing different industry sectors (Bosworth & Collins, 2008). 
Most of these studies use Cobb-Douglas regressions and trans log 
production functions to estimate productivity. In this paper, the Cobb-Douglas 
and trans log production function are also used to estimate productivity. In 
addition, a bridge analysis will be conducted in order to link productivity and 
financial sources to the firms’ industry characteristics. To the knowledge of 
the author, this is the first paper that uses a sample of firms to test the role of 
different financial sources on performance and productivity in China.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the 
methodology that is used to measure labor productivity and capital stock is 
explained. The data is then presented and the basic information on the panel 
data is provided. Section 3 explains the construction of the basic model. This 
is followed by a discussion of the empirical evidence from testing productivity 
and financial sources against the industry characteristics of the firms. Section 
4 presents conclusions and the implications of these results, along with some 
ideas for future research.   
 
2 Preparing the HUAMEI data to measure labor productivity and 
capital stock 
 
2.1 Detailed outline and key concepts 
 
As we mentioned in the first section, because productivity is not directly 
observable, some variants will allow us to conduct our analysis. We use real 
value added (RVA) to show the labor productivity, RVA is derived from the 
nominal value added (NVA), calculated as follows:  
 
                                              (2.1) 
 
According to the (2.1), we need to calculate NVA and PPI, where the PPI is 
RVA = NVA / PPI
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the “ex-factory price indices of industrial products”2. There were sourced from 
the China Statistical Yearbook 2005~20083,and are reported by sector. We 
merged these data into our HUAMEI industry enterprise panel database 
(Table 1). Our next step was to calculate the NVA. Since the NVA is based on 
total factory incomes of enterprises (Peter N. Gal, 2013), we use the formula: 
 
      (2.2)                           
 
The external input cost includes the cost of raw material, basic utilities, 
external processing fees, transportation fees, communication fees4, etc. 
Using equations (2.1) and (2.2), we derive the productivity we need. 
 
Next, we need to calculate capital stock. We use real accounts of fixed assets 
(RFA) to representative capital stock. We obtain the “price indices of 
investment in fixed assets” (FPI) 5  from the China Statistical Yearbook 
2005~2008, and merge these data into our enterprise panel database (Table 
1). Thus, we can use nominal accounts of fixed assets (NFA) divided by the 
FPI, in order to calculate the RFA: 
 
                                           (2.3)  
 
Using (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), we get the key variables. The basic information 
will be reported at next section. 
 
                                            
 
2 The China Statistical Yearbook defines ex-factory price indices of industrial products as follows: 
Data that reflect the trends and degree of change in general ex-factory prices of all industrial 
products during a given period, including sales of industrial products by an industrial enterprise to all 
units outside the enterprise, as well as sales of consumer goods to residents. It can be used to 
analyze the impact of ex-factory prices on gross output value and value added to the industrial 
sector. 
3 Because the China Statistical Yearbook reports the previous year’s data, the 2005~2008 Yearbook 
is used in order to obtain data for 2004~2007.   
4 Since the data on external input cost includes the cost of employees, the cost of external inputs is 
first subtracted, then combined with workers’ wages, in order to get the data required.   
5 China Statistical Yearbook defines the FPI as follows: Data that reflect the trends and degree of 
change in prices of investment goods and projects in fixed assets during a given period. The 
investment in fixed assets consists of three components, namely investment in construction and 
installation, investment in purchases of equipment and instruments, and investment in other items. 
Price indices of investment in fixed assets are calculated as the weighted arithmetic mean of the 
price indices of the three components of investment in fixed assets. 
NVA = Total _ factory_ income− External _ input _cos t
RFA = NFA / FPI
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Table 1 FPI & PPI  (The China Statistical Yearbook 2005~2008)                               (preceding year=100) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FPI (National) 105.6 101.6 101.5 103.9 
PPI (National) 106.1 104.9 103.0 103.1 
PPI by Sector     
Mining and Cleaning of Coal  116.8 123.2 105.0 103.8 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 119.6 129.9 122.0 102.0 
Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 145.3 112.3 96.8 110.3 
Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 117.6 119.6 123.4 112.6 
Mining and Processing of Nonmetal Ores 105.8 109.4 102.5 103.1 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 114.0 101.1 100.1 113.3 
Processing of Foodstuff 102.9 101.5 101.1 102.6 
Manufacture of Beverages 100.6 100.6 100.5 101.2 
Manufacture of Tobacco 101.1 100.9 100.5 100.4 
Manufacture of Textile 104.3 100.5 102.1 100.8 
Manufacture of Textile Apparel, Footwear, and Hats 100.7 99.8 100.9 100.7 
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 100.9 102.5 101.2 102.4 
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and Straw 
Products 
102.2 101.8 102.3 103.6 
Manufacture of Furniture 101.8 102.7 100.3 101.5 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 101.3 101.4 100.7 101.0 
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 98.1 99.6 99.8 100.5 
Manufacture of Articles for Culture, Education and Sport Activities 102.2 102.0 101.4 101.5 
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel 112.2 118.4 118.0 105.0 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 110.2 108.5 100.4 103.8 
Manufacture of Medicines 97.8 101.6 98.6 102.1 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 108.1 104.7 101.2 103.3 
Manufacture of Rubber 101.0 104.5 104.7 103.3 
Manufacture of Plastics 106.5 105.5 101.0 102.0 
Manufacture of Non Metallic Mineral Products 103.3 100.6 101.5 101.3 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 118.9 104.7 96.0 107.9 
Smelting and Pressing of Non Ferrous Metals 118.9 111.7 122.5 113.9 
Manufacture of Metal Products 107.4 104.0 101.0 102.6 
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 103.1 101.8 100.2 101.3 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 101.8 101.8 101.2 101.5 
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 98.2 98.9 99.5 100.1 
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 103.7 103.2 107.4 103.7 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other Electronics 
sEquipment 
95.1 95.3 96.6 97.5 
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural Activities 98.5 98.7 99.2 98.9 
Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 105.7 103.9 102.5 104.3 
Recycling and Disposal of Waste 116.9 105.3 103.4 104.4 
Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power 102.4 104.2 102.8 102.2 
Production and Supply of Gas 102.5 105.2 106.8 104.8 
Production and Supply of Water 104.1 104.0 106.4 104.8 
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2.2 Data and summary statistics  
 
The database used in this empirical analysis is drawn from the annual 
accounting reports provided by HUAMEI enterprise statistics of China. This 
survey provides data on industrial enterprises as unbalance panel data, 
including state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms from 2004 to 2007. 
This period precedes the financial crisis of 2008. All firms with sales lower 
than 1,000 yuan were dropped, so that firms cannot show negative values of 
sales. The total number of key variables is around 230,000, and missing 
values were cleaned.  
 
Table 2 provides the definitions of the variables that are used in this paper. 
The dependent variable is labor productivity; the control variable is the 
capital-labor ratio, and the other independent variables are the financial 
sources, trade credit and bank loans. Accounts payable and accounts 
receivable are used to represent trade credit, and the trade credit value is 
divided into two groups, suppliers and demanders, such that the accounts 
payable variable represents the demanders of trade credit, (i.e. the firm’s 
customers), while the accounts receivable variable represents the suppliers 
of trade credit to the firm’s. Long-term liability is used to represent bank loans. 
Moreover, in order to avoid economies of scale, it is taken as a ratio over total 
sales, and all the financial sources variables are taken as a ratio over total 
assets.  
 
In order to examine the effect of the firm’s size and ownership structure on 
productivity and financial sources, dummy variable groups are created. First, 
the definitions for industry firm size used by the State Statistics Bureau of 
China (SSBC) 2011 are introduced. These definitions are as follows: 
 
 Small:  300 < = sales < 2,000 (10,000CNY units) and employees < 300; 
 Medium: 2,000 < = sales < 40,000 and 300 < = employees < =1,000; 
 Large:   sales > 40,000 and employees > 1,000. 
 
Second, the classification of industry firm ownership is introduced. Ownership 
definitions were first published by SSBC in 1996, and later improved in 2006. 
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The HUAMEI database uses the 2006 definitions. Accordingly, the 
enterprises database is divided into five ownership groups6: 
 
 F1: State Owned Enterprise 
 F2: Collectively Owned Enterprise 
 F3: Private Enterprise  
 F4: Joint Economy & Share Holding Enterprise 
 F5: Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong    
    Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
 
In section 3, firm size and the cross variables of ownership in the regression 
model will be explained. Table 3 presents the mean, standard deviation, and 
min max values of the key variables. 
  
3 Model and analysis 
 
3.1 Regression for labor productivity  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Cobb-Douglas and logarithmic 
transformation production function are used to estimate productivity, with the 
firm level production function given by 
 ln(Yit / Lit ) = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2TCit + β3Bankloanit + β4Year _dummyi + ε it                                                                 
                                                              (3.1-1) 
While function (3.1-1) represents the basic model to be used in this analysis, 
it will be modified in two ways in order to observe the efficiency of the 
different financial sources over productivity. First, in order to observe the 
single financial source, the production function given by 
ln(Yit / Lit ) = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2Bankloanit + β3Year _dummyi + ε it  
                                                              (3.1-2) 
                                            
6  There are 7 ownership groups in the 2006 definitions of SSBC: State-Owned Enterprise, 
Collectively Owned Enterprise, Private Enterprise, Joint Economy, Share Holding Economy, 
Economy Funded by Foreign Entrepreneurs & Entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
and Others. In order to facilitate the data analysis in this paper, the 7 groups were reduced to 5, 
merging Joint Economy and Share Holding Economy, and the Others group was dropped because 
the database has very few data points in this group. 
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Where the variable Lib_sales_ratio and Lib_totassets_ratio are used for bank 
loans. Trade credit is also observed using the payable group and receivable 
group variables.   
 
ln(Yit / Lit ) = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2TCit + β3Year _dummyi + ε it      (3.1-3) 
  
Finally, the regression is run using both the trade credit and bank loans 
variables in the equation, using function (3.1-1) to check their relationship 
with productivity. The regression results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
The results from the first regression are summarized in Table 4. Columns 1 
and 2 show that the coefficient of bank loans is negative and significant, 
which may suggest that the larger the bank loans, the lower the productivity. 
Columns 3 to 6 show that the payable/sales variable is negative and 
significant, but Columns 5 and 6 are positive and significant, so trade credit 
could perhaps promote greater productivity.The results in the Table 5 show 
that, when both the trade credit and bank loans variables are included in the 
model, the coefficient of bank loans presents stable negative and significant 
results. Although one of the payable/sales ratios is negative and significant, 
the other trade credit variables all show a positive and significant relationship 
with the dependent variable, labor productivity. 
 
Thus it may be speculated that enterprises with more trade credit are better 
suited for productivity growth. It is also possible that having higher liquidity 
may increase the burden for enterprises to repay their debts. Moreover, the 
signs of the coefficients of the variables confirm the theory that trade credit 
and bank loans have a substitute relationship with each other (Pertersen & 
Rajan. 1997).In order to assess the features of Chinese industrial enterprises, 
interaction terms are created for the firm-size dummy and ownership dummy, 
and added to the basic equation (function 3.1-1). The interaction terms are 
calculated as bank loans multiplied by firm size, and bank loans multiplied by 
firm ownership. The results are shown in Table 6. The production function is 
given by 
 
ln(Yit / Lit ) = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2Bankloanit + β3TCit + β4Firmsize*Bankloanit
+ β5Ownership*Bankloanit + β6Year _dummyi + ε it (3.1− 4)   
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Table2  Definition of variables  
Variables        Description 
Ln (Y/L)  Dependent variable = log ( RVA / number of workers) 
Ln (K/L)  = Log (capital stock / number of workers) 
PAY_sales_ratio  = Accounts of payable / sales 
RE_sales_ratio  = Accounts of receivable / sales 
PAY_totassets_ratio  = Accounts of payable / sales 
RE_totassets_ratio  = Accounts of payable / total assets 
Lib_sales_ratio  = Long term liability / sales 
Lib_totassets_ratio  = Long term liability / total assets 
Pay_S  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * small firm size  
Pay_M  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * medium firm size  
Pay_B  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * large firm size  
RE_S  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * small firm size  
RE_M  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * medium firm size  
RE_B  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * large firm size  
PAY_F1  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * firm ownership of state 
PAY_F2  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * firm ownership of collectivity 
PAY_F3  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * firm ownership of private 
PAY_F4  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * firm ownership of joint 
PAY_F5  Dummy variable = PAY_sales_ratio * firm ownership of foreign 
RE_F1  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * firm ownership of state 
RE_F2  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * firm ownership of collectivity 
RE_F3  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * firm ownership of private 
RE_F4  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * firm ownership of joint 
RE_F5  Dummy variable = RE_sales_ratio * firm ownership of foreign 
L_Sales_S  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * small firm size  
L_Sales_M  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * medium firm size  
L_Sales_B  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * large firm size  
L_sales_F1  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * firm ownership of state 
L_sales_F2  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * firm ownership of collectivity 
L_sales_F3  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * firm ownership of private 
L_sales_F4  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * firm ownership of joint 
L_sales_F5  Dummy variable = Lib_sales_ratio * firm ownership of foreign 
L_asset_S  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * small firm size  
L_aseet_M  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * medium firm size  
L_asset_B  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * large firm size  
L_asset_F1  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * firm ownership of state 
L_asset_F2  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * firm ownership of collectivity 
L_asset_F3  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * firm ownership of private 
L_asset_F4  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * firm ownership of joint 
L_asset_F5  Dummy variable = Lib_totassets_ratio * firm ownership of foreign 
D_2004  Dummy variable of the year 2004 
D_2005  Dummy variable of the year 2005 
D_2006  Dummy variable of the year 2006 
D_2007  Dummy variable of the year 2007 
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Table 3  Summary statistics of firm-level variables in regression 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(Y/L) 238357 2.742 0.646 0.646 10.535 
ln(K/L) 238115 0.376 1.310 0.000 9.740 
PAY_sales_ratio 238634 0.346 14.995 0.000 5098.200 
RE_sales_ratio 238634 0.406 25.696 0.000 7073.786 
PAY_totassets_ratio 238634 0.143 0.154 0.000 12.922 
RE_totassets_ratio 238634 0.162 0.164 0.000 26.508 
Lib_sales_ratio 238634 0.758 47.368 0.000 14882.200 
Lib_totassets_ratio 238634 0.166 0.232 0.000 54.225 
Pay_S 238634 2.568 3.433 0 13.716 
Pay_M 238634 4.542 4.312 0 14.505 
pay_B 238634 0.841 2.993 0 16.935 
RE_S 238634 2.636 3.506 0 12.464 
RE_M 238634 4.626 4.380 0 13.745 
RE_B 238634 0.825 2.939 0 17.455 
PAY_F1 238634 0.935 2.766 0 16.640 
PAY_F2 238634 0.427 1.766 0 14.901 
PAY_F3 238634 4.972 3.997 0 16.935 
PAY_F4 238634 0.038 0.560 0 15.179 
PAY_F5 238634 1.440 3.357 0 16.546 
RE_F1 238634 0.928 2.737 0 15.757 
RE_F2 238634 0.443 1.824 0 14.849 
RE_F3 238634 5.085 4.056 0 17.455 
RE_F4 238634 0.038 0.566 0 14.305 
RE_F5 238634 1.450 3.375 0 16.244 
L_sales_S 238634 0.606 0.179 0 21.946 
L_sales_M 238634 0.134 0.659 0 85.524 
L_sales_B 238634 0.018 47.365 0 14882.200 
L_sales_f1 238634 0.496 47.270 0 14882.200 
L_sales_f2 238634 0.016 0.476 0 171.333 
L_sales_f3 238634 0.179 2.454 0 965.517 
L_sales_f4 238634 0.003 0.530 0 242.254 
L_sales_f5 238634 0.059 1.734 0 673.296 
L_asset_S 238634 0.070 0.169 0 29.166 
L_aseet_M 238634 0.086 0.193 0 54.225 
L_asset_B 238634 0.010 0.057 0 1.311 
L_asset_f1 238634 0.025 0.130 0 29.166 
L_asset_f2 238634 0.010 0.066 0 8.346 
L_asset_f3 238634 0.103 0.194 0 54.225 
L_asset_f4 238634 0.001 0.020 0 1.657 
L_asset_f5 238634 0.024 0.097 0 7.242 
D_2004 238634 0.258 0.438 0 1 
D_2005 238634 0.239 0.427 0 1 
D_2006 238634 0.241 0.428 0 1 
D_2007 238634 0.262 0.440 0 1 
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Table 4  Results of using only trade credit or only bank loans  
Equations (3.2)   (3.3) 
Variables Ln(Y/L) 
ln_Y_L_new 
 
ln_Y_L_new 
ln_Y_L_new 
ln_Y_L_new 
ln_Y_L_new 
                
ln_K_L 0.226*** 0.226***   0.226*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.232*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lib_sales_ratio -0.000815***             
  (0.000)             
lib_asset_ratio   -0.0580***           
    (0.009)           
PAY_sales_ratio       -0.000621***       
        (0.000)       
RE_sales_ratio         -0.0000475     
          (0.000)     
PAY_totassets_ratio         0.0732***   
            (0.013)   
RE_totassets_ratio             0.249*** 
              (0.015) 
D_2005 0.0849*** 0.0844***   0.0850*** 0.0849*** 0.0847*** 0.0845*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2006 0.192*** 0.191***   0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2007 0.348*** 0.346***   0.348*** 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.346*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 2.671*** 2.680***   2.670*** 2.670*** 2.660*** 2.633*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 237838  237838    237838  237838  237838  237838  
Number of grp_firm 115257 115257   115257 115257 115257 115257 
R-squared 0.210  0.210    0.210  0.210  0.210  0.212  
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5  The results from including both trade credit (TC) and bank loans in the equation   
   Lib_sales_ratio & TC Lib_totassets_ratio & TC 
VARIABLES Dependent variable = ln (Y/L) 
ln (K/L) 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.232*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lib_sales_ratio -0.000822*** -0.000866*** -0.000815*** -0.000813***         
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Lib_totassets_ratio         -0.0580*** -0.0580*** -0.0558*** -0.0542*** 
          (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
PAY_sales_ratio 0.0000126       -0.000619***       
  (0.000)       (0.000)       
RE_sales_ratio   0.0000621       -0.0000475     
    (0.000)       (0.000)     
PAY_totassets_ratio   0.0732***       0.0696***   
      (0.013)       (0.013)   
RE_totassets_ratio       0.249***       0.247*** 
        (0.015)       (0.015) 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
D_2005 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0847*** 0.0845*** 0.0845*** 0.0844*** 0.0843*** 0.0841*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2006 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2007 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.345*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 2.671*** 2.671*** 2.661*** 2.634*** 2.681*** 2.680*** 2.671*** 2.643*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 237838  237838  237838  237838  237838  237838  237838  237838  
Number of grp_firm 115257 115257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.212 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.212 
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6  The results from using the interaction terms (bank loans with firm size, ownership) 
 Lib_sales_ratio * firm size and ownership dummy  Lib_totassets_ratio*firm size and ownership dummy  
VARIABLES dependent variable = ln (Y/L) 
ln_K_L 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.234*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.232*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lib_sales_ratio -0.0223** -0.0223** -0.0221** -0.0218**         
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)         
lib_asset_ratio         0.293*** 0.293*** 0.296*** 0.289*** 
          (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
PAY_sales_ratio -0.000470*       -0.000591***       
  (0.000)       (0.000)       
RE_sales_ratio   0.000034       -0.0000446     
    (0.000)       (0.000)     
PAY_totassets_ratio   0.0713***       0.0672***   
      (0.013)       (0.013)   
RE_totassets_ratio       0.246***       0.240*** 
        (0.015)       (0.015) 
L_sales_S 0.0108 0.0107 0.0106 0.0104 -0.443*** -0.443*** -0.443*** -0.438*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
L_sales_M -0.00539 -0.00541 -0.00548 -0.00549 -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.173*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
L_sales_f1 0.0114*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0587** 0.0587** 0.0567* 0.0601** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
L_sales_f3 0.00511** 0.00506** 0.00511** 0.00506** -0.0799*** -0.0800*** -0.0785*** -0.0735*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
L_sales_f4 0.0273 0.027 0.027 0.0265 0.0949 0.0948 0.0921 0.1 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
L_sales_f5 0.00939*** 0.00941*** 0.00944*** 0.00937*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.133*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
D_2005 0.0844*** 0.0844*** 0.0842*** 0.0840*** 0.0821*** 0.0821*** 0.0819*** 0.0817*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2006 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2007 0.347*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 2.675*** 2.675*** 2.666*** 2.638*** 2.681*** 2.681*** 2.672*** 2.644*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 237838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 
Number of grp_firm 115257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 115,257 
R-squared 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.215 
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 6 reports the estimates on productivity by different financial sources 
based on firm size and ownership of the enterprise. The results show that the 
interaction terms for SMEs have a negative impact on firm productivity. This 
is consistent with the theory that states that, compared with big enterprises, 
SMEs face difficulties in obtaining bank loans in China (Ge & Qiu. 2007). The 
findings also show that the interaction terms for state-owned enterprises all 
have a positive effect on labor productivity. This is also consistent with the 
situation in China, whereby state-owned enterprises are more reliant on bank 
loans (Long & Zhang, 2011). Furthermore, it is noted that the signs in F3 
(private firms) and F5 (economy funded by foreign entrepreneurs) show both 
positive and negative signs. This is a topic to explore in a future study.   
Finally, the last set of dummy variables (trade credit multiplied by firm size 
and firm ownership) are analyzed. Using the same method as the last set of 
variables, interaction terms are created by using the accounts payable and 
accounts receivable variables. The firm level production function is thus given 
by 
 
 
ln(Yit / Lit ) = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2Bankloanit + β3TCit + β4Firmsize*TCit
+ β5Ownership*TCit + β6Year _dummyi + ε it (3.1− 5)
  
 
The results are reported in Table 7. These results show that many variables 
affect the labor productivity. First, all of the signs for bank loan are negative 
and significant, and trade credit (with the exception of PAY_sales_ratio), as 
well as the other trade credit variables, are all positive and significant. This 
suggests that trade credit is a very useful financial source for enterprises. 
However, the variable for SMEs with accounts payable suggest a very strong 
negative effect on the growth of labor productivity. Despite the sign being 
significant, it may be speculated that SMEs use a lot of trade credit in their 
businesses. Another observation from the results in Table 7 is that all of the 
signs of ownership with trade credit are positive and significant, and that 
trade credit is frequently used as a financial source, not by the demander, but 
by the supplier.  
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Table 7  The results from using the interaction terms (TC_PAY with firm size, ownership) 
  TC * firm size and ownership dummy  TC * firm size and ownership dummy  
VARIABLES Dependent variable = ln (Y/L) 
                  
ln_K_L 0.226*** 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.226*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.234*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lib_sales_ratio -0.000664*** -0.000644*** -0.000702*** -0.000663***         
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
lib_asset_ratio         -0.0518*** -0.0489*** -0.0505*** -0.0482*** 
          (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
PAY_sales_ratio 0.0000339       -0.000476***       
  (0.000)       (0.000)       
PAY_totassets_ratio 0.150***       0.147***     
    (0.015)       (0.015)     
RE_sales_ratio     0.0000561       -0.0000329   
      (0.000)       (0.000)   
RE_totassets_ratio       0.320***       0.319*** 
        (0.016)       (0.016) 
PAY_S  or RE_S -0.0261*** -0.0282*** -0.0244*** -0.0281*** -0.0261*** -0.0283*** -0.0244*** -0.0282*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pay_M  or RE_M -0.00643*** -0.00811*** -0.00516*** -0.00835*** -0.00646*** -0.00813*** -0.00519*** -0.00837*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PAY_F1 or RE_F1 0.00724*** 0.00364** 0.00901*** 0.00232 0.00713*** 0.00357** 0.00888*** 0.00221 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PAY_F3 or RE_F3 0.00590*** 0.00240** 0.00723*** 0.000829 0.00576*** 0.00232** 0.00713*** 0.000755 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PAY_F4 or RE_F4 0.0116*** 0.00831** 0.0126*** 0.00707** 0.0115*** 0.00829** 0.0125*** 0.00703** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
PAY_F5 or RE_F5 0.00772*** 0.00348** 0.0110*** 0.00294* 0.00749*** 0.00333** 0.0108*** 0.00283* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
D_2005 0.0766*** 0.0763*** 0.0763*** 0.0760*** 0.0762*** 0.0759*** 0.0759*** 0.0756*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2006 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
D_2007 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 2.731*** 2.751*** 2.709*** 2.736*** 2.741*** 2.760*** 2.718*** 2.745*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Observations 237838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 237,838 
Number of grp_firm 115257 115257 115257 115257 115257 115257 115257 115257 
R-squared 0.219 0.22 0.219 0.221 0.219 0.22 0.219 0.221 
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.2 Regression on profitability 
 
In order to check the regression results with labor productivity, profitability 
ratio is introduced as another dependent variable, measured as the operating 
profitability / total sales (OSR). The same model as the labor productivity 
regressions is used, only with a different depended variable. First the basic 
model is given by 
OSR = β0 + β1TCit + β2Bankloanit + β3Year _dummyi + ε it (3.2 −1)   
Where the OSR is defined by the ratio of operating profitability over total 
sales. The difference with (3.1-1) is that in this equation, the labor capital ratio 
is dropped. Because a Cobb-Douglas regression is not used, it is not 
necessary to add the labor capital ratio to the function. The purpose of this 
section is to check the effects of the two financial sources, bank loans and 
trade credit, not on labor productivity, but on the profitability of enterprises. 
Because there may be negative growth for firms’ net profitability, the ratio of 
operating profitability over total sales is used to check the different financial 
sources. If the regression results is same or similar to the regression results 
with TFP, it will be strong evidence to support the theory of productivity. This 
is because profitability delegate the growth of enterprises, similar to 
productivity. 
 
First, the efficiency of single financial sources over the ratio of operating 
profitability to total sales (OPR, below) is observed, following (3.2-1). The 
results are reported in Table 8. All the signs of the coefficients are negative, 
and in some cases, bank loans are significant. This suggests that each of 
these types of liabilities, when used independently, are not very useful in 
increasing the profitability of enterprises. This may be change when the bank 
loans and trade credit are used together. This regression also follows the 
model (3.2-1), and the results are reported in the Table 9. The results show 
that the signs of most of the coefficients did not change. Some of the signs of 
the coefficients became positive, but are not significant. Following the same 
process as the labor productivity regression, the dummy variables for firm 
size and ownership are added, and bank loans are listed first, so this function 
is given by 
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OPR = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2Bankloanit + β3TCit + β4Firmsize*Bankloanit
+ β5Ownership*Bankloanit + β6Year _dummyi + ε it (3.2 − 2)  
 The results are reported in Table 10.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
lib_sales_ratio -0.212***
(0.001)
lib_asset_ratio -0.0668
(0.059)
PAY_sales_ratio -0.197***
(0.001)
RE_sales_ratio -0.0433***
(0.000)
PAY_totassets_ratio -0.104
(0.083)
RE_totassets_ratio 0.0661
(0.093)
D_2005 -0.0233* -0.0312* -0.0096 -0.0218 -0.0305* -0.0306*
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
D_2006 -0.0345*** -0.0521*** -0.0306** -0.0457*** -0.0507*** -0.0510***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
D_2007 -0.0326** -0.0410** -0.0149 -0.0284* -0.0390** -0.0392**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.123*** -0.0185 0.0215** -0.0192* -0.0158 -0.0412**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019)
Observations 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634
Number of grp_firm 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572
R-squared 0.365 0.100 0.240 0.098 0.023 0.024
Standers errors in partentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8   The rsults of using only trade credit or only bank loans
Indenpend Variable: Protibility/Total sales     
With Bank loans With Trade credit
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect
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VARIABLES
Lib_sales_ratio -0.176*** -0.197*** -0.212*** -0.212***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lib_asset_ratio -0.0513 -0.067 -0.0702 -0.0659
(0.052) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059)
PAY_sales_ratio -0.0617*** -0.197***
(0.001) (0.001)
RE_sales_ratio -0.0183*** -0.0433***
(0.000) (0.000)
PAY_totassets_ratio -0.124* (0.108)
(0.066) -0.0833
RE_totassets_ratio 0.002 0.064
(0.074) (0.093)
D_2005 -0.018 -0.0201 -0.0231* -0.0233* -0.0101 -0.0224 -0.0311* -0.0312*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
D_2006 -0.0310** -0.0334** -0.0342*** -0.0345*** -0.0314** -0.0467*** -0.0518*** -0.0520***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
D_2007 -0.0261* -0.0285** -0.0324** -0.0326** -0.0162 -0.0301* -0.0409** -0.0410**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.140*** 0.122*** 0.0307** -0.00714 -0.00256 -0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634
Number of grp_firm 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572
R-squared 0.378 0.381 0.365 0.365 0.240 0.098 0.023 0.024
Table 9    The results of  using both Trade Credit and Bank loans
Standers errors in partentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Dependent Variable: Protibility/Total sales
Lib_sales_radio & Trade Credit Lib_totassets_radio & Trade Credit
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect
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Table 10 shows that all of the bank loans variables have positive effects on 
profitability, but bank loans to SMEs have a negative effect on their 
profitability. Some of the sings of the coefficients of trade credit is positive, 
but still not significant. Moreover, the effect of trade credit based on firm size 
and ownership dummy are evaluated. The production function is given by 
OSR = β0 + β1 ln(Kit / Lit )+ β2Bankloanit + β3TCit + β4Firmsize*TCit
+ β5Ownership*TCit + β6Year _dummyi + ε it (3.2 − 3)
 
Results are shown in Table 11. The coefficient for small sized enterprises is 
VARIABLES
lib_sales_ratio 0.0982* 0.0918* 0.0966* 0.0974*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
lib_asset_ratio 0.097 0.218 0.242 0.245
(0.235) (0.256) (0.269) (0.269)
PAY_sales_ratio -0.0359*** -0.197***
(0.001) (0.001)
RE_sales_ratio -0.0162*** -0.0433***
(0.000) (0.000)
PAY_totassets_ratio -0.057 -0.107
(0.064) (0.083)
RE_totassets_ratio 0.093 0.062
(0.071) (0.093)
L_Sales_S -0.122** -0.121** -0.128** -0.128*** -0.171 -0.32 -0.352 -0.352
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.191) (0.208) (0.219) (0.219)
L_Sales_M -0.0978** -0.0989** -0.0991** -0.0996** -0.0983 -0.161 -0.173 -0.174
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.182) (0.199) (0.209) (0.209)
L_sales_f1 -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.00812 -0.0403 -0.0327 -0.0351
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.167) (0.182) (0.192) (0.192)
L_sales_f3 -0.00542 0.00564 -0.00699 -0.00697 -0.0338 -0.051 -0.065 -0.0609
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.158) (0.172) (0.181) (0.181)
L_sales_f4 -3.388*** -3.391*** -3.411*** -3.411*** -0.0256 -0.054 -0.0586 -0.0605
(0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.550) (0.599) (0.631) (0.631)
L_sales_f5 0.0308*** 0.0337*** 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 0.059 0.027 0.0185 0.025
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.206) (0.224) (0.236) (0.236)
D_2005 -0.0142 -0.0141 -0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0107 -0.0236 -0.0325** -0.0326**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
D_2006 -0.0172 -0.0176 -0.0178 -0.0179 -0.0325** -0.0487*** -0.0541*** -0.0543***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
D_2007 -0.0103 -0.00954 -0.0122 -0.0123 -0.0178 -0.0333** -0.0446** -0.0446**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.0814*** 0.0794*** 0.0913*** 0.0679*** 0.0294** -0.0111 -0.00611 -0.0324
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023)
Observations 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634
Number of grp_firm 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572
R-squared 0.420 0.428 0.416 0.416 0.240 0.098 0.236 0.235
Standers errors in partentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10  The resurts by interaction terms (Bank_loans with Firm size, ownership dummy)
 Dependent Variable: Protibility/Total sales
Lib_sales_radio * firm size and ownership dummy Lib_totassets_radio * firm size and ownership dummy
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect
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positive and significant, but almost all the other signs of the coefficients are 
negative. Therefore, the analysis of firms’ productivity yielded mixed signs for 
both bank loans and trade credit. It is recommended that other approaches 
be tested in order to prove the theory set out in this paper.   
 
 
VARIABLES
lib_sales_ratio -0.176*** -0.212*** -0.197*** -0.212***
(0.001) -0.000797 (0.001) (0.001)
lib_asset_ratio -0.046 -0.063 -0.060 -0.059
(0.052) (0.059) -0.0564 (0.059)
PAY_sales_ratio -0.0617*** -0.197***
(0.001) (0.001)
PAY_totassets_ratio -0.126* -0.098
(0.074) (0.093)
RE_sales_ratio -0.0183*** -0.0433***
(0.000) (0.000)
RE_totassets_ratio 0.032 0.051
-0.0821 (0.103)
Pay_S 0.00770* 0.00810* -0.002 -0.0202***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Pay_M 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
PAY_F1 -0.005 -0.008 0.014 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
PAY_F3 -0.003 -0.003 0.0103* 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
PAY_F4 0.006 0.005 0.020 0.019
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023)
PAY_F5 -0.005 -0.007 0.014 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
RE_S 0.006 0.006 -0.0131** -0.0181***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
RE_M 0.001 0.001 -0.002 (0.004)
(0.004) -0.00386 (0.005) -0.00485
RE_F1 -0.003 -0.006 0.013 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
RE_F3 -0.003 -0.006 0.0108* 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
RE_F4 0.010 0.008 0.026 0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
RE_F5 -0.009 -0.013 0.0171* 0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
D_2005 -0.015 -0.020 -0.012 -0.0381** -0.017 -0.020 -0.0281* -0.0379**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
D_2006 -0.0262** -0.0292** -0.0360** -0.0643*** -0.0287** -0.0292** -0.0571*** -0.0641***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
D_2007 -0.019 -0.0244* -0.0232 -0.0608*** -0.021 -0.0242* -0.0466*** -0.0600***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant 0.108*** 0.139*** -0.052 0.010 0.124*** 0.148*** -0.049 -0.026
(0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.053) -0.0412 (0.042) (0.051) (0.054)
Observations 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634 238634
Number of grp_firm 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572 115572
R-squared 0.378 0.365 0.24 0.012 0.381 0.365 0.098 0.023
Standers errors in partentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11   The results by interaction terms(Trade Credit  with Firm size, ownership Dummy)
         Dependent Variable: Protibility/Total sales
Payable * firm size and ownership Receviable * firm size and ownership
Notes: The model is estimated using fixed effect.
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4. Conclusions  
 
It is well known that financial sources and financial efficiency play a vital role 
in the growth of enterprises. This study was conducted in order to better 
understand how different financial sources can affect the growth of 
enterprises. There is a large body of research on productivity and financial 
sources concerning Chinese industry enterprises, but there are few studies 
that link them together.  
 
An unbalance panel database of China industry enterprises was used to find 
an efficient bridge to link productivity and financial efficiency. The results 
show that enterprises using trade credit can increase labor productivity more 
than these enterprises using bank loans. The study also found that large 
enterprises or state-owned enterprises can increase their labor productivity 
using bank loans more than trade credit. But if large enterprises or 
state-owned enterprises are treated as the suppliers of trade credit, these 
enterprises may supply trade credit by collecting funding from bank loans.  
 
The same models were also used to check the effects of two financial 
sources—bank loans and trade credit—on the profitability of enterprises, in 
order to support the productivity theory of bank loans and trade credit. 
However, there is no a strong evidence for it. These discrepancies in the 
results suggest that future studies should continue to find stronger evidence 
to support the findings in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
Acknowledgments 
 
The author wishes to thank Prof. Jinushi, Prof. Fujiwara, Prof. Sato, Prof. 
Yamori, Prof. Uchida, and Prof. Mieno for their useful comments, as well as 
Prof. Kajitani for his research support. 
 
References 
 
Anming Zhang, Yimin Zhang, Ronald Zhao (2002). “Profitability and  
  productivity of Chinese industrial firms Measurement and ownership  
  implications,” China Economic Review, 13, 65-88. 
Bosworth, B., & Collins, S. M. (2008). “Accounting for growth: comparing  
  China and India,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(1), 45−66. 
Chen, K., Wang, H. C., Zheng, Y. X., Jefferson, G. H., & Rawski, T. G.(1988).  
  “Productivity change in Chinese Industry: 1953–1985,” Journal of  
  Comparative Economics, 12(4), 570−591. 
Charles W. Calomiris, Charles P. Himmelberg (1995). “Commercial paper, 
  corporate finance, and the business cycle: a microeconomic perspective,” 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy  42. 1995, 203-250 
  Chow, G. C. (2008). “Another look at the rate of increase in TFP in China,”  
  Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies, 6(2), 219−224. 
Chow, G. C., & Lin, A. (2002). “Accounting for Economic Growth in Taiwan  
  and Mainland China: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Comparative  
  Economics, 30(3), 507−530. 
Cheryl Long, Xiaobo Zhang (2011). “Cluster-based industrialization in China:  
  Financing and performance,” Journal of International Economics, 84,  
  112-123. 
John Mcmillan and Christopher Woodruff (1999). “Interfirm Relationships and  
  Informal Credit in Vietnam,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,  
  November 1999.  
Love, I., Preve, L.A., Sarria-Allende, V. (2007). “Trade credit and bank credit:  
  Evidence from recent financial crises,” Journal of Financial Economics, 83,  
  453-469.  
Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G.Rajan (1997). “Trade Credit: Theories  
  and Evidence,” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.10, No.3, 661-691. 
Perkins, D. H., & Rawski, T. G. (2008). “Forecasting China's economic  
 66 
  growth over the next two decades,” Chapter 20. In L. Brandt, & T. G.  
  Rawski (Eds.), China's Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge and  
  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Raymond Fisman and Inessa Love (2003). “Trade Credit, Financial  
  Intermediary Development, and Industry Growth,” The Journal of Finance,  
  Vol. 58, No. 1 Feb., 2003, 353-374.  
Shiyi Chen, Gary H., Jefferson, Jun Zhang (2011). “Structual change,  
  productivity growth and industrial transformation in China,” China  
  Economic Review, 22, 133-150. 
Cheryl Long, Xiaobo Zhang (2011). “Cluster-based industrialization in China:  
  Financing and performance,” Journal of International Economics, 84,  
  112-123. 
Woo, W.T, Hai, W., Jin, W., & Fan, G. (1994). “How successful has Chinese  
  enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus,” Journal of  
  Comparative Economics, Volume 18, Issue 3, June 1994, 410–437. 
Xiaolou Yang (2011). “The role of trade credit in the recent subprime financial  
  crisis,” Journal of Economics and Business, 63, 2011, 517–529.  
Ying Ge a, Jiaping Qiu b (2007). “Financial development, bank discrimination 
  and trade credit,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 31, 513–530.  
Yul W. Lee and John D. Stowe (1993). “Product Risk, Asymmetric 
  Information, and Trade Credit,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative  
  Analysis, Volume 28, Issue 02, June 1993, 285-300. 
 
 67 
Conclusions for the whole paper 
 
This research attempts to identify a suitable financial channel for SMEs and 
shed some insight on how to improve their access to financing sources by 
comparing the different financing approaches and analyzing how the different 
financial sources affect the productivity of SMEs.  
 
Chapter 1 focused on relationship banking and SME finance. This study finds 
that the merits of relationship banking are clearly exist. It is concluded that 
relationship banking is an effective method for SMEs seeking to raise capital in 
China. 
 
Chapter 2 examined another finance approach - trade credit - and compared it 
with the bank loans. Unlike large enterprises, the SMEs more prefer to use trade 
credit as a substitute for bank loans. 
 
Chapter 3 analyzed a different point of view by measuring the effect of different 
financing approaches on a firm’s labor productivity. It is found that enterprises 
experienced productivity increases when they used trade credit more heavily. 
 
It is widely recognized that the financing environment for SMEs needs to be 
improved. It is worth conducting further investigation in order to identify suitable 
financing meatheads for Chinese SMEs. This research suggests that SMEs’ 
financing difficulties cannot simply be overcome, but that a careful analysis of 
various approaches needs to be carried out in order to identify the best approach 
that is suited to SMEs’ needs. In doing so, the following should be considered:  
 
) The financial information collection system for SMEs can be improved. 
Because there are no special organizations that gather financial information from 
SMEs, the asymmetric information problem cannot fundamentally be corrected 
until such a system is built. Until then, the relationship banking model may be 
one way to resolve the financing difficulties of Chinese SMEs by enabling the 
collection of soft information. Moreover, if SMEs are unable to gain financial 
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support by on their own, they may be able to use other financial intermediaries to 
obtain loans. According to Fan (2013), a successful financial intermediary 
business model exits in Qingdao, Shandong province, and built since 2005, 
named called “fu yuan yun tong”. It is a private enterprise that specializes in 
addressing the financing difficulties of SMEs. If the Chinese government could 
use the “fu yuan yun tong” business model as a reference, it may present a 
viable solution for the problem of asymmetric and help to resolve the financing 
difficulties of SMEs.     
 
	 ) Small and medium-sized financial institutions for SMEs can be improved. 
According to the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) 
Survey of 2009, over 95% of SMEs cannot access bank loans from state-owned 
banks. The needs of SMEs are very different from large or state-owned 
enterprises, and they have internal factors that prevent them from obtaining 
loans from state-owned banks. Therefore, establishing the small and 
medium-sized financial institutions that cater to SMEs may allow firms to build 
long-term borrower relationships with these banks, and thus resolve the problem 
of asymmetric information. Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2011) find that 
relationship lending costs are high for SMEs at large banks, while the benefits 
from relationship banking are greater at small banks.  
 
) A broad variety of financial approaches for SMEs should be encouraged. If 
access to formal financing is limited for SMEs, other financing approaches 
should be encouraged. According to Chapter 2 and 3, trade credit may be a 
good way to resolve the financing difficulties of SMEs.  
 
To summarize, improving the access to financing sources for SMEs is not a 
simple matter, and will take a long time, particularly in developing counties 
where financial institutions are less developed. Government support is also 
important for the development of SMEs. It will be worthwhile to study the effects 
of Chinese monetary policy on SMEs financing in the future. 
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